Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
AbstractEffectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model--i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries--which has a Nash consistent representation. The latter means that there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions satisfying the minimal requirement of respecting first order stochastic dominance among lotteries. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 65 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Effectivity function Game form Nash consistent representation Lottery model;
Other versions of this item:
- Peleg,Bezalel & Peters,Hans, 2005. "Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2005. "Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models," Discussion Paper Series dp404, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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