Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
AbstractInformation aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been characterized in models where bidders know exactly how many rivals they face. A model allowing for uncertainty over the number of bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: as the numbers of winning and losing bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It may be possible for the seller to impart this information by precommitting to a specified fraction of winning bidders, via a proportional selling policy. Intuitively, this could make the proportion of winners known, and thus provide all the information that bidders need to make winner's curse corrections.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 62 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Pekec & Ilia Tsetlin, 2005. "Information Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders," Working Papers 0605, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
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