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Holdouts, backdating and wage negotiations

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Author Info
Houba, Harold
Bolt, Wilko

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-418PPBJ-9/2/c5abe7b718641a8138657d42fa87f59f
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 44 (2000)
Issue (Month): 9 (October)
Pages: 1783-1800
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:9:p:1783-1800

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  1. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-028/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Steinar Holden, 2001. "Monetary Policy and Nominal Rigidities under Low Inflation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Delay in a bargaining game with contracts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(4), pages 339-353, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kurtis Swope, Pamela Schmitt, John Cadigan and Robert Shupp, 2008. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game," Departmental Working Papers 21, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "On The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(3), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  6. Leif Danziger, 2006. "Extension of Labor Contracts and Optimal Backpay," IZA Discussion Papers 2366, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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