Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents: Comment
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 85 (1995)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
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- Harold Houba & Gijsbert van Lomwel, 2001. "Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 81-99.
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- Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2008. "On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 509-519, December.
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- Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0706, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Houba, Harold & Bolt, Wilko, 2000. "Holdouts, backdating and wage negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1783-1800, October.
- Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2011. "Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 507-516.
- Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2007. "Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-070/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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- Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "On The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(3), pages 1-6.
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