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Wage-employment determination and a union tax on capital: Can theory and evidence be reconciled?

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  • Hirsch, Barry T.
  • Prasad, Kislaya

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 48 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 61-71

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:48:y:1995:i:1:p:61-71

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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  1. Walter J. Wessels, 1991. "Do unions contract for added employment?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 45(1), pages 181-193, October.
  2. Abowd, John M, 1989. "The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 774-800, September.
  3. Orley Ashenfelter & James N. Brown, 1985. "Testing the Efficiency of Employment Contracts," Working Papers 573, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  4. Manning, Alan, 1987. "An Integration of Trade Union Models in a Sequential Bargaining Framework," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(385), pages 121-39, March.
  5. MaCurdy, Thomas E & Pencavel, John H, 1986. "Testing between Competing Models of Wage and Employment Determination in Unionized Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages S3-S39, June.
  6. Johnson, George E, 1990. "Work Rules, Featherbedding, and Pareto-optimal Union-Management Bargaining," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(1), pages S237-59, January.
  7. Alan Manning, 1992. "How Robust is the Microeconomic theory of the Trade Union?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0065, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  8. Clark, Andrew, 1990. "Efficient Bargains and the McDonald-Solow Conjecture," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(4), pages 502-28, October.
  9. Colin Lawrence & Robert Z. Lawrence, 1985. "Manufacturing Wage Dispersion: An End Game Interpretation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 16(1), pages 47-116.
  10. Paz Espinosa, Maria & Rhee, Changyong, 1989. "Efficient Wage Bargaining as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 565-88, August.
  11. Baldwin, Carliss Y, 1983. "Productivity and Labor Unions: An Application of the Theory of Self-Enforcing Contracts," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(2), pages 155-85, April.
  12. Dow, Gregory K, 1993. "Why Capital Hires Labor: A Bargaining Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 118-34, March.
  13. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
  14. Clark, Kim B, 1984. "Unionization and Firm Performance: The Impact on Profits, Growth, and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 893-919, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Wagner, Joachim & Schnabel, Claus & Schank, Thorsten & Addison, John T., 2005. "Do Works Councils Inhibit Investment?," Discussion Papers 32, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  2. A. Cassoni & G. Fachola & G. Labadie, 2001. "The impact of unions on the economic performance of firms," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1501, Department of Economics - dECON.
  3. Hirsch, Barry T., 2007. "Sluggish Institutions in a Dynamic World: Can Unions and Industrial Competition Coexist?," IZA Discussion Papers 2930, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Volokh, Alexander, 2010. "Privatization, free riding, and industry-expanding lobbying," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 62-70, March.
  5. Adriana Cassoni & Gaston J. Labadie & Gabriela Fachola, 2002. "The Economic Effects of Unions in Latin America: Their Impact on Wages and the Economic Performance of Firms in Uruguay," Research Department Publications 3159, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  6. Nicholas Lawson, 2011. "Is Collective Bargaining Pareto Efficient? A Survey of the Literature," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 282-304, September.

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