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The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public School

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  • D, S, Hosken

    (Crest)

  • David Margolis

    (Crest)

Abstract

This paper develops a bargaining model of wage and employment determination for the public sector. The solution to the model generates structural wage and employment equations that are estimated using data from New York State teacher-school district collective bargaining agreements.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 97-55.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:97-55

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References

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  1. Currie, Janet, 1991. "Employment Determination in a Unionized Public-Sector Labor Market: The Case of Ontario's School Teachers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 45-66, January.
  2. Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," Papers of Peter Cramton 92aer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  3. Manning, Alan, 1987. "An Integration of Trade Union Models in a Sequential Bargaining Framework," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(385), pages 121-39, March.
  4. Ashenfelter, Orley & Johnson, George E, 1969. "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 35-49, March.
  5. Eberts, Randall W & Stone, Joe A, 1986. "On the Contract Curve: A Test of Alternative Models of Collective Bargaining," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(1), pages 66-81, January.
  6. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. MacPherson, 1993. "Union membership and coverage files from the Current Population Surveys: Note," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 46(3), pages 574-578, April.
  7. Abowd, John M, 1989. "The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 774-800, September.
  8. Megdal, Sharon Bernstein, 1984. "A model of local demand for education," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 13-30, July.
  9. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
  10. MaCurdy, Thomas E & Pencavel, John H, 1986. "Testing between Competing Models of Wage and Employment Determination in Unionized Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages S3-S39, June.
  11. Svejnar, J., 1984. "Bargaining power, fear of disagreement and wage settlements: theory and evidence from U.S. industry," CORE Discussion Papers 1984037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 563-87, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Amigues, J-P & Favard, P & Gaudet, G & Moreaux, M, 1996. "On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute is Limited," Cahiers de recherche 9628, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  2. Fontagne, Lionel & Mirza, Daniel, 2007. "International trade and rent sharing among developed and developing countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 523-558, May.
  3. Lionel Fontagné & Daniel Mirza, 2001. "International Trade and Rent Sharing in Developed and Developing countries," Working Papers 2001-09, CEPII research center.
  4. Touhami, A. & Martens, A., 1996. "Macroemesures in Computable General Equilibrium Models: a Probabilistic Treatment with an Application to Morocco," Cahiers de recherche 9621, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.

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