Labor Unions and the Economic Performance of Unions
AbstractHirsch develops a model of union rent-seeking in which the unions capture a share of quasi-rents that make up the normal ROI in long-lived capital and R&D. He finds that in response, firms adjust their investments in vulnerable tangible and intangible capital. Hirsch also attempts to explain the connection between the contraction of the size of unions which occurred in the 1970s and firms' lower profitability, diminished market value, and lower investment levels.
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Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in its series Books from Upjohn Press with number luepf and published in 1991.
ISBN: paper 9780880991100
Note: PDF is the book's first chapter
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unions; labor-management relations; restructuring; collective bargaining; union-management relations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
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