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The importance of the electoral rule: Evidence from Italy

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  • Bordignon, Massimo
  • Monticini, Andrea

Abstract

We test the effect of an important electoral reform implemented in Italy from 1993 to 2001, that moved the system for electing the Parliament from purely proportional to a plurality rule (for 75% of the seats). We do not find any effect on either the number of parties or the stability of governments (the two main objectives of the reform) that remained unchanged at their pre-reform level.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 117 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 322-325

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:322-325

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Keywords: Electoral system; Plurality rule; Duverger’s law; Bootstrap;

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  1. Massimo Bordignon & Guido Tabellini, 2009. "Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0087, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  2. Russell Davidson & Emmanuel Flachaire, 2000. "The Wild Bootstrap, Tamed at Last," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1413, Econometric Society.
  3. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Do Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political Systems?," Working Papers 232, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  4. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, 2001. "Electoral Rules and Corruption," NBER Working Papers 8154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Davidson, James & Monticini, Andrea & Peel, David, 2007. "Implementing the wild bootstrap using a two-point distribution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 309-315, September.
  6. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926, December.
  7. Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2010. "Endogenous Constitutions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 1-39, 03.
  8. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?," Working Papers 189, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  9. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 25-45, March.
  10. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," NBER Working Papers 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Fredriksson, Per G. & Millimet, Daniel L., 2004. "Electoral rules and environmental policy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 237-244, August.
  12. Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"," NBER Working Papers 11235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Galasso, Vincenzo & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2009. "Competing on Good Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 7363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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Cited by:
  1. Nicholas Crafts & Marco Magnani, 2011. "The Golden Age and the Second Globalization in Italy," Quaderni di storia economica (Economic History Working Papers) 17, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  2. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "H.P. Minsky And Policies To Countervail Crises," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  3. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "The Debate on the Crisis: Recent Reappraisals of the Concept of Functional Finance," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0105, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  4. Massimo Bordignon & Gilberto Turati, 2014. "Electoral Rules and Municipal Finances: Evidence From Two Reforms in Italy," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(1), pages 24-28, 04.

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