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The form of government and fiscal dynamics

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  • Andersen, Jørgen Juel

Abstract

Using a combination of time series variation in oil prices and cross-section variation in the oil intensity of countries, this paper investigates whether exogenous shifts in the government revenues affect the government expenditures differently depending on the political institutions of the form of government. Comparing the fiscal policy dynamics in parliamentary and presidential systems, a main finding is that the government expenditures appear more responsive to shifts in the revenues when the form of government is presidential.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 27 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 297-310

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:2:p:297-310

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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Keywords: Political economy Constitutions Fiscal policy Fiscal dynamics Oil price;

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Cited by:
  1. James Rockey, 2010. "Reconsidering the Fiscal Effects of Constitutions," Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Leicester 10/16, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.

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