Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games
AbstractBy introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and conflict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 105 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Conflict of interest Coalition Policy invariance Nash equilibrium existence Controllability;
Other versions of this item:
- Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Piacquadio Paolo Giovanni, 2009. "Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games," wp.comunite 0054, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- ACOCELLA, Nicola & DI BARTOLOMEO, Diovanni & PIACQUADIO, Paolo G., . "Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2236, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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