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Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games

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Author Info

  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

    (University of Rome I)

  • Nicola Acocella

    (University of Rome I)

Abstract

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2005.132.

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Date of creation: Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.132

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Keywords: Policy games; policy ineffectiveness; static controllability; Nash equilibrium existence;

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References

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  1. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Nicola Acocella, 2005. "Non-Neutrality Of Monetary Policy In Policy Games," Macroeconomics, EconWPA 0504026, EconWPA.
  2. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-54, April.
  3. Hughes Hallett, Andrew J, 1989. "Econometrics and the Theory of Economic Policy: The Tinbergen-Theil Contributions 40 Years On," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 189-214, January.
  4. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26, January.
  5. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1994. " The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 33-46, April.
  6. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Controllability and non-neutrality of economic policy: The Tinbergen’s approach in a strategic context," Macroeconomics, EconWPA 0504034, EconWPA.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hallett, Andrew Hughes & Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2010. "Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 55-67, March.
  2. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Non-neutrality of economic policy: An application of the Tinbergen-Theil’s approach to a strategic context," Macroeconomics, EconWPA 0504035, EconWPA, revised 26 Apr 2005.
  3. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2008. "When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy communication and controllability," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7078, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2007. "Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation," wp.comunite 0020, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  5. Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Acocella, Nicola, 2011. "Tinbergen controllability and n-player LQ-games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 32-34, October.
  6. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Piacquadio Paolo Giovanni, 2009. "Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games," wp.comunite 0054, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  7. Pauline Barrieu & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2009. "Economic Policy when Models Disagree," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2009s-03, CIRANO.
  8. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2011. "The Optimality and Controllability of Discretionary Monetary Policy," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2011-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  9. N. Acocella & G. Bartolomeo & Andrew Hallett, 2006. "Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 91-112, September.
  10. Nicola acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Andrew Hughes Hallett, . "The theory of economic policy: from a theory of control to a theory of conflict (resolutions)," Working Papers, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF 91/11, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.
  11. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2010. "Conflict of interest and coordination in public good provision," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 389-408.
  12. Pauline Barrieu & Sinclair Desgagné, 2009. "Economic policy when models disagree," Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Papers, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment 4, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.

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