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Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games

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  • Acocella, N.
  • Di Bartolomeo, G.

Abstract

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 90 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 213-218

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:90:y:2006:i:2:p:213-218

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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References

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  1. Hughes Hallett, Andrew J, 1989. "Econometrics and the Theory of Economic Policy: The Tinbergen-Theil Contributions 40 Years On," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 189-214, January.
  2. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Nicola Acocella, 2005. "Non-Neutrality Of Monetary Policy In Policy Games," Macroeconomics 0504026, EconWPA.
  3. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-54, April.
  4. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1991. "The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," CEPR Discussion Papers 551, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Controllability and non-neutrality of economic policy: The Tinbergen’s approach in a strategic context," Macroeconomics 0504034, EconWPA.
  6. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Nicola acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Andrew Hughes Hallett, . "The theory of economic policy: from a theory of control to a theory of conflict (resolutions)," Working Papers 91/11, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.
  2. Pauline Barrieu & Bernard Sinclair Desgagne, 2009. "Economic policy when models disagree," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37607, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2008. "When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy communication and controllability," CEPR Discussion Papers 7078, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Hughes Hallett Andrew & Acocella Nicola, 2008. "Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations," wp.comunite 0034, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  5. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Non-neutrality of economic policy: An application of the Tinbergen-Theil's approach to a strategic context," Working Papers 82, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  6. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Piacquadio Paolo Giovanni, 2009. "Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games," wp.comunite 0054, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  7. Pauline Barrieu & Sinclair Desgagné, 2009. "Economic policy when models disagree," Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Papers 4, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
  8. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2007. "Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation," MPRA Paper 4419, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2011. "The Optimality and Controllability of Discretionary Monetary Policy," Working papers 2011-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  10. Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Acocella, Nicola, 2011. "Tinbergen controllability and n-player LQ-games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 32-34, October.
  11. N. Acocella & G. Bartolomeo & Andrew Hallett, 2006. "Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 91-112, September.
  12. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2010. "Conflict of interest and coordination in public good provision," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 389-408.

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