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Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Ana, MAULEON
Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))
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We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe (J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994, 299-235) to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when prayers are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement. the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the largest consistent set and is the unique one to belong to the largest cautious consistent set.
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number
2003003.
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Length: 25
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2003Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2003003Contact details of provider: Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium) Fax: +32 10473945 Email: Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/econ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: coalition formation ; farsightedness ; cautiousness ; positive spillovers ; largest consistent set ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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