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Tinbergen And Theil Meet Nash: Controllability In Policy Games

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Author Info
Nicola Acocella (University of Rome I)
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (University of Rome I)

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Abstract

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy developed by Tinbergen and Theil to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/mac/papers/0504/0504036.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Macroeconomics with number 0504036.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 26 Apr 2005
Date of revision: 06 Sep 2005
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0504036

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 9
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Policy games; policy ineffectiveness; static controllability; Nash equilibrium existence.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2004. "Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 695-707, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-54, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1994. " The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 33-46, April.
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2007. "Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation," MPRA Paper 4419, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. N. Acocella & G. Bartolomeo & Andrew Hallett, 2006. "Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 91-112, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Piacquadio Paolo Giovanni, 2009. "Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games," wp.comunite 0054, Department of Communication, University of Teramo. [Downloadable!]
  4. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Non-neutrality of economic policy: An application of the Tinbergen-Theil's approach to a strategic context," Working Papers 82, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Hughes Hallett Andrew & Acocella Nicola, 2008. "Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations," wp.comunite 0034, Department of Communication, University of Teramo. [Downloadable!]
  6. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2008. "When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy communication and controllability," CEPR Discussion Papers 7078, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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