The existence of Nash equilibria in n-player LQ-games, with applications to international monetary and trade agreements
Abstract
The paper studies the relationship between equilibrium existence in LQ games and the classical theory of economic policy, generalizing some recent results. In particular, by focusing on system controllability instead of the controllability by one or some of the players, we find conditions for the existence of the Nash equilibrium that extend those required by the previous literature. The usefulness of our results is described by some examples in the field of international monetary and trade agreements.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by Department of Communication, University of Teramo in its series wp.comunite with number 0040.Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0040
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://wp.comunite.it/
Related research
Keywords:Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2008-04-15 (Central Banking)
- NEP-GTH-2008-04-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MAC-2008-04-15 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2008-04-15 (Monetary Economics)
References
No references listed on IDEASYou can help add them by filling out this form.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Hughes Hallett Andrew & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Acocella Nicola, 2008. "Controllability under rational expectations," wp.comunite 0042, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Piacquadio Paolo Giovanni, 2009.
"Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games,"
wp.comunite
0054, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Piacquadio, Paolo G., 2009. "Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 303-305, December.
- Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2010. "Convergenza di interessi, conflitto e coordinamento nella fornitura di beni pubblici," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 389-408.
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0040For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Giovanni Di Bartolomeo).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

