Money and price dynamics in a market with strategic bargaining
AbstractThis paper studies a strategic bargaining model of money and prices to complement the results reported in Coles and Wright (1998). The probability of a bargaining breakdown is chosen to be consistent with market conditions in the spirit of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985). The unique monetary steady state coincides with the one under asymmetric Nash bargaining. The dynamics of the price level are determined without any reference to the value of search. The dynamic properties of the model resemble those of traditional monetary models.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
money; bargaining; price dynamics.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Melvyn Cole & Randall Wright, .
"A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money,"
CARESS Working Papres
97-9, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Coles, Melvyn G. & Wright, Randall, 1998. "A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 32-54, January.
- Brock, William A., 1975. "A simple perfect foresight monetary model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 133-150, April.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1985.
"Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
623, David K. Levine.
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.