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On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit

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  • Dolors Berga

    ()
    (Universitat de Girona)

  • Alejandro Neme

    ()
    (Universidad Nacional de san Luis and CONICET)

  • Jordi Massó

    ()
    (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

  • Gustavo Bergantiños

    ()
    (Universidade de Vigo)

Abstract

We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. We show that, under plausible restrictions on preferences, equilibria of this two-stage game satisfy stability and voter's sovereignty.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
Issue (Month): 21 ()
Pages: 1-9

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08d70024

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  1. Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J., 2001. "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 40-78, October.
  2. Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2004. "Stability and voting by committees with exit," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 229-247, October.
  3. Berga, Dolors & Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2003. "On Exiting after Voting," Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona, Department of Economics, University of Girona 6, Department of Economics, University of Girona.
  4. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Barbera, Salvador & Perea, Andres, 2002. "Supporting others and the evolution of influence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(12), pages 2051-2092, October.
  6. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Jonathan Shalev & Daniel Granot & Michael Maschler, 2003. "Voting for voters: the unanimity case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 155-202.
  8. Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 152-175, September.
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