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Stability and voting by committees with exit

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Author Info
Dolors Berga ()
Gustavo Bergantiños ()
Jordi Massó ()
Alejandro Neme ()

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Abstract

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder’s sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 23 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 229-247
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:2:p:229-247

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  1. Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2008. "Dichotomous Preferences and Power Set Extensions," Discussion Papers in Economics 6431, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2004. "Good and bad objects: the symmetric difference rule," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(11), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings," ISER Discussion Paper 0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  4. D. Berga & G. Bergantiños & J. Massó & A. Neme, 2006. "On Exiting After Voting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 33-54, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung & Yongsheng Xu, 2006. "Procedural group identification," Working Papers 383, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2008. "On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(21), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
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