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Stability and voting by committees with exit

Author

Listed:
  • Dolors Berga
  • Gustavo Bergantiños
  • Jordi Massó
  • Alejandro Neme

Abstract

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder’s sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2004. "Stability and voting by committees with exit," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(2), pages 229-247, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:2:p:229-247
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. D. Berga & G. Bergantiños & J. Massó & A. Neme, 2006. "On Exiting After Voting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 33-54, April.
      • Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2003. "On exiting after voting," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 30(2 Year 20), pages 261-288, December.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:11:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver, 2010. "Simple Collective Identity Functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 417-443, April.
    4. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2018. "On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 83-97, January.
    5. Dimitrov, Dinko & Sung, Shao Chin & Xu, Yongsheng, 2007. "Procedural group identification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 137-146, September.
    6. Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 13-29, January.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:21:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 152-175, September.
    9. Dolors Berga & Alejandro Neme & Jordi Massó & Gustavo Bergantiños, 2008. "On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(21), pages 1-9.
    10. Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2016. "Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 20-29.
    11. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings," ISER Discussion Paper 0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    12. Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Unanimity in Attribute-Based Preference Domains," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01061994, HAL.
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4ccevsvsdm96qpv5fgamlf1p1p is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/4ccevsvsdm96qpv5fgamlf1p1p is not listed on IDEAS

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