Trade protection and bureaucratic corruption: an empirical investigation
AbstractWe examine whether protectionist trade policies lead to increased bureaucratic corruption. Using multiple measures of corruption and trade policies, we find strong evidence that corruption is significantly higher in countries with protectionist trade policies. These results are robust to endogeneity concerns. Next, a panel-data-based GMM methodology is used to estimate a dynamic model of corruption. This estimator controls for country-specific effects, potential endogeneity of trade policy, and existence of measurement errors afflicting the corruption data. The paper strengthens the case for trade liberalization and argues that trade reforms may lead to improvements in governance.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 42 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Elbahnasawy, Nasr G., 2014. "E-Government, Internet Adoption, and Corruption: An Empirical Investigation," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 114-126.
- Shepherd, Ben, 2009. "Speed Money: Time, Corruption, and Trade," MPRA Paper 17337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fenske, James, 2010.
"Ecology, trade and states in pre-colonial Africa,"
27203, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- James Fenske, 2014. "Ecology, Trade, And States In Pre-Colonial Africa," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 612-640, 06.
- James Fenske, 2012. "Ecology, Trade and States in Pre-Colonial Africa," Economics Series Working Papers WPF/2012-18, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- James Fenske, 2012. "Ecology, trade and states in pre-colonial Africa," CSAE Working Paper Series 2012-18, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Van-Ha Le & Jakob de Haan & Erik Dietzenbacher, 2013. "Do Higher Government Wages Reduce Corruption? Evidence Based on a Novel Dataset," CESifo Working Paper Series 4254, CESifo Group Munich.
- Carlos Felipe Jaramillo & Daniel Lederman & Maurizio Bussolo & David Gould & Andrew Mason, 2006. "Challenges of CAFTA : Maximizing the Benefits for Central America," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7127, August.
- Starosta de Waldemar, Felipe, 2010.
"How costly is rent-seeking to diversification: an empirical approach,"
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010
4, Verein fÃ¼r Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Felipe Starosta De Waldemar, 2010. "How costly is rent-seeking to diversification : an empirical approach," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00461486, HAL.
- Felipe Starosta de Waldemar, 2010. "How costly is rent-seeking to diversification : an empirical approach," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10008, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.