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Marriage and employment participation with wage bargaining in search equilibrium

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  • Roberto Bonilla
  • Alberto Trejos

Abstract

We build an equilibrium search model where married couples make joint decisions on home production and labour market participation and analyse the implications of our results for a frictional marriage market. A worker's bargaining position reflects their productivity, and the productivity and employment status of their spouse. People sometimes accept transitory jobs only to raise the spouse's long‐term wages. Firms sometimes reduce turnover by unilaterally increasing a worker's wage, ensuring that the spouse stays at home.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Bonilla & Alberto Trejos, 2021. "Marriage and employment participation with wage bargaining in search equilibrium," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 68(4), pages 517-533, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:68:y:2021:i:4:p:517-533
    DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12289
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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