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Marriage Premium and Class

Author

Listed:
  • Roberto Bonilla
  • Francis Z. Kiraly
  • John Wildman

Abstract

We present an equilibrium model with inter-linked labour and marriage markets, and argue that search frictions play an important role in explaining the male marriage premium. If men are viewed as bread-winners within households, this expectation a¤ects their job search behaviour, which in turn can lead to marital wage gaps ranked across productivities. Male heterogeneity is neither necessary nor sufficient for this premium. Nonetheless, when coupled with female heterogeneity in the marriage market, male reservation wages linked to productivities do affect the resulting assortative matching structure, and equilibrium marriage classes exhibit their own patterns of marital wage differentials. Using UK data on wages, male/female heterogeneity and marital classes, we also carry out the first empirical test of the role of search frictions in generating the male marriage premium.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Bonilla & Francis Z. Kiraly & John Wildman, 2017. "Marriage Premium and Class," CESifo Working Paper Series 6550, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6550
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bonilla, Roberto & Malo, Miguel Á. & Pinto, Fernando, 2022. "Marriage wage premium with contract type heterogeneity," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    frictional labour markets; frictional marriage markets; marriage premium; classes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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