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Male Investment in Schooling with Frictional Labour and Marriage Markets

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  • Roberto Bonilla
  • Francis Kiraly

Abstract

We present an equilibrium model with inter-linked frictional labour and marriage markets. Women’s flow value of being single is treated as given, and it captures returns from employment. Single unemployed men conduct a so-called constrained sequential job search, and can choose to improve their labour market returns as well as their marriage prospects by undertaking a costly ex-ante investment in schooling. We establish the existence of market equilibria where a fraction of men get educated, and show that this fraction decreases if women’s labour market returns increase. We also examine the robustness of such equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Bonilla & Francis Kiraly, 2019. "Male Investment in Schooling with Frictional Labour and Marriage Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 7901, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7901
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Browning,Martin & Chiappori,Pierre-André & Weiss,Yoram, 2014. "Economics of the Family," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521795395.
    2. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz & Ilyana Kuziemko, 2006. "The Homecoming of American College Women: The Reversal of the College Gender Gap," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 133-156, Fall.
    3. Grossbard,Shoshana A. (ed.), 2003. "Marriage and the Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521891431.
    4. Roberto Bonilla & Francis Kiraly & John Wildman, 2019. "Beauty Premium And Marriage Premium In Search Equilibrium: Theory And Empirical Test," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(2), pages 851-877, May.
    5. Gould, Eric D. & Paserman, M. Daniele, 2003. "Waiting for Mr. Right: rising inequality and declining marriage rates," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 257-281, March.
    6. Christopher Flinn & Joseph Mullins, 2015. "Labor Market Search And Schooling Investment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(2), pages 359-398, May.
    7. Grossbard,Shoshana A. (ed.), 2003. "Marriage and the Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521814546.
    8. Bonilla, Roberto & Kiraly, Francis, 2013. "Marriage wage premium in a search equilibrium," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 107-115.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Bonilla & Francis Kiraly & John Wildman, 2022. "Marriage premium with productivity heterogeneity," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 317-328, January.
    2. Roberto Bonilla & Francis Z. Kiraly & John Wildman, 2017. "Marriage Premium and Class," CESifo Working Paper Series 6550, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    returns to education; frictional markets; constrained search;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I26 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Returns to Education
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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