Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The Division of Spoils: Rent-Sharing and Discrimination in a Regulated Industry

Contents:

Author Info

  • Sandra E. Black
  • Philip E. Strahan

Abstract

Until the middle of the 1970s, regulations constrained banks' ability to enter new markets. Over the subsequent 25 years, states gradually lifted these restrictions. This paper tests whether rents fostered by regulation were shared with labor, and whether firms were discriminating by sharing these rents disproportionately with male workers. We find that average compensation and average wages for banking employees fell after states deregulated. Male wages fell by about 12 percent after deregulation, whereas women's wages fell by only 3 percent, suggesting that rents were shared mainly with men. Women's share of employment in managerial positions also increased following deregulation.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.91.4.814
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 91 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 814-831

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:4:p:814-831

Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.4.814
Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Winston, Clifford, 1993. "Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1263-89, September.
  2. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 1998. "Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation," Working Papers 785, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  3. Sandra E. Black & Elizabeth Brainerd, 1999. "Importing equality? The effects of increased competition on the gender wage gap," Staff Reports 74, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  4. Judith K. Hellerstein & David Neumark & Kenneth R. Troske, 1998. "Market Forces and Sex Discrimination," Labor and Demography, EconWPA 9807002, EconWPA.
  5. Kane, Edward J, 1996. "De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(2), pages 141-61, May.
  6. Stephen Prowse, 1997. "Corporate Control In Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 509-527, December.
  7. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald & Peter Sanfey, 1992. "Wages, Profits and Rent-Sharing," NBER Working Papers 4222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
  9. Nicholas Economides & R. Glen Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1993. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 93-23, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  10. Demsetz, Harold, 1973. "Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-9, April.
  11. Paul S. Calem, 1994. "The impact of geographic deregulation on small banks," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Nov, pages 17-31.
  12. Susan McLaughlin, 1995. "The impact of interstate banking and branching reform: evidence from the states," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 1(May).
  13. R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1994. "Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry," NBER Working Papers 4704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Oswald, Andrew, 1996. "Rent-Sharing in the Labor Market," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 474, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  15. Ashenfelter, Orley & Hannan, Timothy, 1986. "Sex Discrimination and Product Market Competition: The Case of the Banking Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 149-73, February.
  16. James Peoples, 1998. "Deregulation and the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 111-130, Summer.
  17. Borjas, George J & Ramey, Valerie A, 1995. "Foreign Competition, Market Power, and Wage Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(4), pages 1075-1110, November.
  18. Ernst FEHR & Simon GÄCHTER & Georg KIRCHSTEIGER, 1994. "Reciprocal Fairness and Noncompensating Wage Differentials," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics vie9401, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  19. Kroszner, Randall S & Strahan, Philip E, 1996. " Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Crisis: Dividends, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions, and Financial Distress," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1285-1319, September.
  20. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November.
  21. Rose, Nancy L, 1987. "Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1146-78, December.
  22. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-41, September.
  23. Jayaratne, Jith & Strahan, Philip E, 1996. "The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(3), pages 639-70, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:4:p:814-831. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.