The Division of Spoils: Rent-Sharing and Discrimination in a Regulated Industry
AbstractUntil the middle of the 1970s, regulations constrained banks' ability to enter new markets. Over the subsequent 25 years, states gradually lifted these restrictions. This paper tests whether rents fostered by regulation were shared with labor, and whether firms were discriminating by sharing these rents disproportionately with male workers. We find that average compensation and average wages for banking employees fell after states deregulated. Male wages fell by about 12 percent after deregulation, whereas women's wages fell by only 3 percent, suggesting that rents were shared mainly with men. Women's share of employment in managerial positions also increased following deregulation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 91 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James Peoples, 1998. "Deregulation and the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 111-130, Summer.
- Oswald, Andrew, 1996. "Rent-Sharing in the Labor Market," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 474, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J & Sanfey, Peter, 1996.
"Wages, Profits, and Rent-Sharing,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 227-51, February.
- Jayaratne, Jith & Strahan, Philip E, 1996. "The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(3), pages 639-70, August.
- Sendhil Mullainathan & Marianne Bertrand, 1998.
"Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation,"
98-19, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 1999. "Is There a Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 535-554, Autumn.
- Bertrand, M. & Mullainathan, S., 1998. "Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation," Papers 203, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 1998. "Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation," NBER Working Papers 6807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ernst FEHR & Simon GÄCHTER & Georg KIRCHSTEIGER, 1994.
"Reciprocal Fairness and Noncompensating Wage Differentials,"
Vienna Economics Papers
vie9401, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 1996. "Reciprocal fairness and noncompensating wage differentials," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5921, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1973. "Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-9, April.
- Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
- Paul S. Calem, 1994. "The impact of geographic deregulation on small banks," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Nov, pages 17-31.
- Sandra E. Black & Elizabeth Brainerd, 1999. "Importing equality? The effects of increased competition on the gender wage gap," Staff Reports 74, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Judith K. Hellerstein & David Neumark & Kenneth R. Troske, 1998.
"Market Forces and Sex Discrimination,"
Labor and Demography
- Nicholas Economides & R. Glen Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1993.
"The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks,"
93-23, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Economides, Nicholas & Hubbard, R Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1996. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 667-704, October.
- Nicholas Economides & R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1996. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks," NBER Working Papers 5210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Economides, N. & Hubbard, R.G. & Palia, D., 1995. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks," Papers 95-14, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
- Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1995.
"Executive pay and performance Evidence from the U.S. banking industry,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 105-130, September.
- R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1995. "Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry," NBER Working Papers 4704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Susan McLaughlin, 1995. "The impact of interstate banking and branching reform: evidence from the states," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 1(May).
- Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November.
- Winston, Clifford, 1993. "Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1263-89, September.
- Kroszner, Randall S & Strahan, Philip E, 1996. " Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Crisis: Dividends, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions, and Financial Distress," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1285-1319, September.
- Rose, Nancy L, 1987. "Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1146-78, December.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-41, September.
- Borjas, George J & Ramey, Valerie A, 1995. "Foreign Competition, Market Power, and Wage Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(4), pages 1075-1110, November.
- Kane, Edward J, 1996. "De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(2), pages 141-61, May.
- Ashenfelter, Orley & Hannan, Timothy, 1986. "Sex Discrimination and Product Market Competition: The Case of the Banking Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 149-73, February.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.