Corporate Control in Commercial Banks
AbstractUnique factors in commercial banks' legal and regulatory environment may influence their mechanisms of corporate control. I investigate this issue in a sample of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) by analyzing how many underwent a change in corporate control by hostile takeover, friendly merger, management turnover by the board, or intervention by regulators I compare the relative importance of these methods with those in nonfinancial firms. I relate the use of these methods to BHC board and ownership structure and performance. I find that the most important corporate control mechanism in banks is regulatory intervention, and that the primary market-based corporate control mechanism is action by the board of directors. Overall, however, BHC boards are much less assertive than their counterparts at nonfinancial firms. I examine reasons for this.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Finance Association & Southwestern Finance Association in its journal Journal of Financial Research.
Volume (Year): 20 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
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