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Scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Flavio Menezes & Paulo Monteiro, 2003. "Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 85-98, August.
  2. Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2014. "Optimal sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 61-71.
  3. Donna, Javier & Espin-Sanchez, Jose, 2014. "Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The Case of Water Auctions," MPRA Paper 55079, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Mezzetti, Claudio, 2008. "Aversion to Price Risk and the Afternoon Effect," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 857, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Coatney, Kalyn T. & Shaffer, Sherrill L. & Menkhaus, Dale J., 2012. "Auction prices, market share, and a common agent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 61-73.
  6. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald & Vermeulen, Dries, 2010. "Sequential auctions with synergies: The paradox of positive synergies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(3), pages 139-141, December.
  7. Barbosa, Klenio & Boyer, Pierre C., 2021. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
  8. Veronika Grimm, 2004. "On Procurement Auctions Of Complementary Goods," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  9. Timothy N. Cason & Karthik N. Kannan & Ralph Siebert, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 667-688, April.
  10. Charles J. Thomas, 2010. "Information Revelation And Buyer Profits In Repeated Procurement Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 79-105, March.
  11. Audrey Hu & Liang Zou, 2016. "Sequential Auctions with Generalized Interdependent Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-016/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  12. Saini, Viplav, 2010. "Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 303-306, September.
  13. Das Varma, Gopal, 2003. "Bidding for a process innovation under alternative modes of competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 15-37, January.
  14. Veronika Grimm, 2007. "Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 1-27, January.
  15. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2005. "Stochastic synergies in sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 183-201, April.
  16. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Repeated Contests with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 89-118, February.
  17. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2017. "Subcontracting and the survival of plants in the road construction industry: A panel quantile regression analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 113-131.
  18. Emmanuel LORENZON, 2020. "Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions," Bordeaux Economics Working Papers 2020-20, Bordeaux School of Economics (BSE).
  19. Jeitschko, Thomas D., 1999. "Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-72, July.
  20. Audrey Hu & Liang Zou, 2014. "Sequential Auctions, Price Trends, and Risk Preferences," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-139/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  21. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald, 2007. "Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 64-69, October.
  22. Xiaoshu Xu & Dan Levin & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Auctions with synergy and resale," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 397-426, May.
  23. Ding, Wei & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2010. "Signal jamming in a sequential auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 58-61, July.
  24. GUNAY, Hikmet & MENG, Xin, 2017. "Which good to sell first in a sequential auction?," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-45, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
  25. Li, Sanxi & Sun, Hailin & Yan, Jianye & Yu, Jun, 2015. "Bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 96-106.
  26. Münster, Johannes, 2008. "Repeated contests with asymmetric information [Wiederholte Wettkämpfe mit asymmetrischer Information]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-08, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  27. Wittwer, Milena, 2020. "Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 506-530.
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