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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

In: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Rationalizable Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 11, pages 375-404, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  2. Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
  3. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  4. Tilman Borgers & Doug Smith, 2012. "Robustly Ranking Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 325-329, May.
  5. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
  6. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions," Working Papers 2010-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Müller, Christoph, 2020. "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  8. Ziegler, Gabriel & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2020. "Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 197-215.
  9. Rodrigo A. Velez & Alexander L. Brown, 2018. "Empirical Equilibrium," Papers 1804.07986, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
  10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 5, pages 195-239, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  11. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2015. "Ex post self-implementation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 357-367, October.
  12. Victor H. Aguiar & Per Hjertstrand & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Yu Chen & Zhenhua Wu, 2012. "Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium," CAEPR Working Papers 2012-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
  15. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2021. "A network solution to robust implementation: The case of identical but unknown distributions," Economics Working Papers 1776, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  16. Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model," MPRA Paper 37630, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
  17. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2023. "On Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity," Working Papers 202315, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
  18. Victor H. Aguiar & Per Hjertstrand & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  19. R Jain & M Lombardi, 2021. "On the Relationship between Robust and Rationalizable Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 21-A004, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  20. , & Smith, Doug, 2014. "Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  21. Modibo Camara & Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen, 2020. "Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior," Papers 2009.05518, arXiv.org.
  22. Rodrigo A. Velez & Alexander L. Brown, 2019. "Empirical strategy-proofness," Papers 1907.12408, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
  23. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence reading mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
  24. Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele, 2022. "Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
  25. Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Informational robustness of common belief in rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 592-597.
  26. de Castro, Luciano I. & Liu, Zhiwei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017. "Implementation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 20-33.
  27. Caleb Koch, 2020. "Implementation with ex post hidden actions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 5(1), pages 1-35, December.
  28. Penta, Antonio, 2015. "Robust dynamic implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 280-316.
  29. Adachi, Tsuyoshi, 2014. "Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 96-101.
  30. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via transfers with identical but unknown distributions," Economics Working Papers 1676, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  31. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
  32. repec:inu:caeprp:2012-008 is not listed on IDEAS
  33. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
  34. Yamashita, Takuro, 2015. "Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 267-279.
  35. Kyungmin Kim & Antonio Penta, 2012. "A Robustly Efficient Auction," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 248, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
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