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An Economic Analysis of Slavery

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Sonnabend, Hendrik, 2015. "Good Intentions and Unintended Evil? Clients’ Punishment in the Market for Sex Services with Voluntary and Involuntary Providers," EconStor Preprints 110682, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  2. Rick Geddes & Dean Lueck, 2002. "The Gains From Self-Ownership and the Expansion of Women's Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1079-1092, September.
  3. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2011. "The Economics of Labor Coercion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(2), pages 555-600, March.
  4. Rick Geddes & Dean Lueck & Sharon Tennyson, 2012. "Human Capital Accumulation and the Expansion of Women's Economic Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(4), pages 839-867.
  5. Geloso, Vincent & Kufenko, Vadim & Arsenault-Morin, Alex P., 2023. "The lesser shades of labor coercion: The impact of seigneurial tenure in nineteenth-century Quebec," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
  6. Lucas, David S. & Fuller, Caleb S. & Piano, Ennio E., 2018. "Rooking the state," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 12-20.
  7. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2008. "Protection costs, transaction costs,and economic theory," MPRA Paper 17648, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Versiani, Flávio Rabelo, 1994. "Brazilian slavery: toward an economic analysis," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 48(4), October.
  9. Lueck, Dean & Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Property Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 183-257, Elsevier.
    • Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Property Law," Working papers 2004-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  10. Alessandro Morselli, 2021. "Rationality, Information Power and Institutional Theory," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 12(2).
  11. Kritikos, Alexander S., 2000. "Indenture: an institution for a credible commitment without extortion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 397-403, November.
  12. Links, Calumet & Green, Erik & Fourie, Johan, 2018. "Was Slavery a Flexible Form of Labour? Division of Labour and Location Specific Skills on the Eastern Cape Frontier," African Economic History Working Paper 42/2018, African Economic History Network.
  13. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2016. "A positive theory of the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 153-175, September.
  14. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370.
  15. Sonnabend, Hendrik & Stadtmann, Georg, 2018. "Good intentions and unintended evil? Adverse effects of criminalizing clients in paid sex markets with voluntary and involuntary prostitution," Discussion Papers 400, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
  16. Mark Yanochik & Bradley Ewing & Mark Thornton, 2001. "A new perspective on antebellum slavery: Public policy and slave prices," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(3), pages 330-340, September.
  17. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
  18. Pietri, Antoine, 2015. "« Propriété » ou « possession » : une question de sémantique…ou de paradigme ? [“Property” or “possession”: just a matter of semantics…or paradigm?]," MPRA Paper 67096, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1990. "Violence in Incentives: Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," Discussion Papers 871, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Candela, Rosolino A. & Piano, Ennio E., 2020. "The Art and Science of Economic Explanation: Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Yoram Barzel," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 119-126, April.
  21. Phillip W. Magness & Art Carden & Ilia Murtazashvili, 2023. "Gordon Tullock and the economics of slavery," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 185-199, October.
  22. Piano, Ennio E. & Rouanet, Louis, 2020. "Desertion as theft," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 169-183, April.
  23. Allen, Douglas W., 2002. "The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 204-231, April.
  24. Flávio Rabelo Versiani & Maria Eduarda Tannuri-Pianto & José Raimundo Oliveira Vergolino, 2003. "Demand Factors in the Nineteenth-Century Brazilian Slave Market," Anais do XXXI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 31st Brazilian Economics Meeting] a31, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  25. Ron Rogowski, 2013. "Slavery: a dual-equilibrium model with some historical examples," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 189-209, June.
  26. Vahabi, Mehrdad & Klebaner, Samuel, 2023. "Une nouvelle perspective sur la prédation, le conflit, le capitalisme et le changement institutionne (Une évaluation critique de l’école de régulation), entretien de Mehrdad Vahabi avec Samuel Klebane," MPRA Paper 119567, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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