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Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Paul Dütting & Felix Fischer & David C. Parkes, 2019. "Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(1), pages 196-211, February.
  2. Andor Goetzendorff & Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Robert W. Day, 2015. "Compact Bid Languages and Core Pricing in Large Multi-item Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(7), pages 1684-1703, July.
  3. Dütting, Paul & Fischer, Felix & Parkes, David C., 2016. "Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions," Scholarly Articles 32227268, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
  5. Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2011. "A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 15-17, January.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Marek Bojko & Paul Dutting & Renato Paes Leme & Haifeng Xu & Song Zuo, 2024. "Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information," Papers 2412.16132, arXiv.org.
  7. White, Alexander, 2013. "Search engines: Left side quality versus right side profits," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 690-701.
  8. Frank Kelly & Peter Key & Neil Walton, 2016. "Efficient Advert Assignment," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(4), pages 822-837, August.
  9. Dirk Bergemann & Marek Bojko & Paul DŸtting & Renato Paes Leme & Haifeng Xu & Song Zuo, 2025. "Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2418R1, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. Liran Einav & Chiara Farronato & Jonathan Levin, 2016. "Peer-to-Peer Markets," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 615-635, October.
  11. Martin, Simon & Schlag, Karl H., 2020. "Split it up to create incentives: Investment, public goods and crossing the river," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  12. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & David C. Parkes & Richard Steinberg, 2024. "Combinatorial Auctions in Practice," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 517-553, June.
  13. Dütting, Paul & Fischer, Felix & Parkes, David C., 2019. "Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 85877, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  14. Patrick Hummel, 2018. "Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey–Clarke–Groves and generalized second-price bids," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 331-350, March.
  15. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
  16. Martin, Simon & Schlag, Karl, 2017. "Finite Horizon Holdup and How to Cross the River," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168136, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  17. Gomes, Renato & Sweeney, Kane, 2014. "Bayes–Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 421-437.
  18. Augenblick, Ned & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2018. "To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 318-329.
  19. Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5455-5478, September.
  20. Martin, Simon & Schlag, Karl, 2017. "Finite Horizon Holdup and How to Cross the River," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168136, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  21. Ko, Chiu Yu & Konishi, Hideo, 2012. "Profit-maximizing matchmaker," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 217-232.
  22. Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2011. "A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 15-17, January.
  23. Wilfred Amaldoss & Kinshuk Jerath & Amin Sayedi, 2016. "Keyword Management Costs and “Broad Match” in Sponsored Search Advertising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(2), pages 259-274, March.
  24. Bichler, Martin & Goeree, Jacob K., 2017. "Frontiers in spectrum auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 372-391.
  25. Peter Cramton, 2013. "Spectrum Auction Design," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
  26. Manjunath, Vikram & Westkamp, Alexander, 2021. "Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
  27. Dütting, Paul & Henzinger, Monika & Starnberger, Martin, 2018. "Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87419, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  28. Yue Yin, 2025. "InfoBid: A Simulation Framework for Studying Information Disclosure in Auctions with Large Language Model-based Agents," Papers 2503.22726, arXiv.org.
  29. Kos, Nenad, 2012. "Communication and efficiency in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 233-249.
  30. Yan, Haomin, 2021. "Position auctions with multi-unit demands," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 179-193.
  31. Blumrosen, Liad & Feldman, Michal, 2013. "Mechanism design with a restricted action space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 424-443.
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