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Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder Welfare

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?," IEW - Working Papers 166, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  2. Bebchuk, Lucian & Cohen, Alma & Wang, Charles C.Y., 2014. "Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 140-154.
  3. Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2015. "CEO Preferences and Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2813-2852, December.
  4. Lefanowicz, Craig E. & Robinson, John R. & Smith, Reed, 2000. "Golden parachutes and managerial incentives in corporate acquisitions: evidence from the 1980s and 1990s," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 215-239, July.
  5. Eisfeldt, Andrea L. & Rampini, Adriano A., 2008. "Managerial incentives, capital reallocation, and the business cycle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 177-199, January.
  6. Mansi, Sattar A. & Wald, John K. & Zhang, Andrew (Jianzhong), 2016. "Severance agreements and the cost of debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 426-444.
  7. Sarig, Oded H. & Talmor, Eli, 1997. "In defense of defensive measures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 277-297, June.
  8. Mark S. Johnson & Ramesh P. Rao, 1999. "The impact of anti-takeover charter amendments on expectations of future earnings and takeover activity," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 75-86.
  9. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger, 2006. "CEO Compensation and Strategy Inertia," CEPR Discussion Papers 5713, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
  11. King, Tao-Hsien Dolly & Wen, Min-Ming, 2011. "Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 512-531, March.
  12. Almazan, A. & Suarez, J., 1999. "Optimal Corporate Governance Structures," Papers 9907, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
  13. Roland Kirstein, 2024. "Strategic delegation in Nash bargaining," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 45(2), pages 784-794, March.
  14. Brown, Kareen & Pacharn, Parunchana & Patterson, Evelyn, 2022. "Managerial replacement strategies and severance pay," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
  15. Roland Bel, 2018. "A property rights theory of competitive advantage," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 1678-1703, June.
  16. Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller, 2010. "CEO Replacement Under Private Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(8), pages 2935-2969, August.
  17. Vicente Cuñat & Mireia Giné & Maria Guadalupe, 2020. "Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti‐Takeover Provisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(5), pages 2591-2629, October.
  18. Dey, Aiyesha & White, Joshua T., 2021. "Labor mobility and antitakeover provisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2).
  19. Riccardo Calcagno & Sonia Falconieri, 2008. "White Knights and the Corporate Governance of Hostile Takeovers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-118/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  20. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger, 2005. "Keeping the Board in the Dark: CEO Compensation and Entrenchment," CEPR Discussion Papers 5315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Al Dah, Bilal & Michael, Amir & Dixon, Rob, 2017. "Antitakeover provisions and CEO monetary benefits: Revisiting the E-index," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 992-1004.
  22. Guthrie, Graeme, 2021. "A dynamic model of managerial entrenchment and the positive incentives it creates," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
  23. Sokolyk, Tatyana, 2011. "The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 612-627, June.
  24. Stráska, Miroslava & Waller, Gregory, 2010. "Do antitakeover provisions harm shareholders?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 487-497, September.
  25. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2013. "Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement ," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-890, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  26. repec:tsa:wpaper:0030fin is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Elijah Brewer & William E. Jackson & Larry D. Wall, 2006. "When target CEOs contract with acquirers: evidence from bank mergers and acquisitions," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  28. Meg Adachi‐Sato, 2018. "Stock vesting conditions, control benefits and managerial replacement," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(1), pages 275-313, February.
  29. McNeil, Chris & Niehaus, Greg & Powers, Eric, 2004. "Management turnover in subsidiaries of conglomerates versus stand-alone firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 63-96, April.
  30. James M. Mahoney & Joseph T. Mahoney, 1993. "Abstract," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 17-31, January.
  31. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sharma, Zenu, 2011. "Incentives and innovation : evidence from CEO compensation contracts," Research Discussion Papers 17/2011, Bank of Finland.
  32. Lukas, Elmar & Welling, Andreas, 2012. "Negotiating M&As under uncertainty: The influence of managerial flexibility on the first-mover advantage," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 29-35.
  33. Haan, Marco A. & Riyanto, Yohanes, 2006. "The effects of takeover threats on shareholders and firm value," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 45-68, January.
  34. Bill B. Francis & Iftekhar Hasan & Zenu Sharma & Maya Waisman, 2019. "Motivating high‐impact innovation: Evidence from managerial compensation contracts," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(3), pages 291-318, August.
  35. Offenberg, David & Officer, Micah S., 2014. "The totality of change-in-control payments," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 75-87.
  36. Erin E. Smith, 2019. "Are Antitakeover Amendments Good for Shareholders? Evidence from the Adoption of Antitakeover Provisions in the Post-SOX Era," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(04), pages 1-40, December.
  37. Roland Kirstein, 2009. "Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining," FEMM Working Papers 09001, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  38. Andres Christian & Jacob Martin & Ulrich Lennart, 2019. "Takeover Protection and Firm Value," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-46, March.
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