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Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kyung Hwan Baik & In‐Gyu Kim, 2007. "Strategic Decisions On Lawyers’ Compensation In Civil Disputes," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 854-863, October.
  2. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2016. "Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 16-23.
  3. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2004. "Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-119, March.
  4. Gabuthy, Yannick & Peterle, Emmanuel & Tisserand, Jean-Christian, 2021. "Legal Fees, Cost-Shifting Rules and Litigation: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  5. Kyung Hwan Baik, 2007. "Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(4), pages 986-1002, April.
  6. Henderson, James & Leleux, Benoit & White, Ian, 2006. "Service-for-equity arrangements: Untangling motives and conflicts," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 886-909, November.
  7. Osborne, Evan, 1999. "Who should be worried about asymmetric information in litigation?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 399-409, September.
  8. Frank H. Stephen, 2013. "Lawyers, Markets and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14803, March.
  9. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2010. "Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ? Les apories de l’analyse économique," Working Papers hal-04140922, HAL.
  10. Josh Lerner, 2010. "The Litigation of Financial Innovations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 807-831.
  11. Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C. F., 1995. "Contracting with spatial externalities and agency problems The case of retail leases," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 355-372, June.
  12. Rudy Santore & Alan D. Viard, 1999. "Legal fee restrictions, moral hazard, and attorney profits," Working Papers 9912, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  13. Brad Graham & Jack Robles, 2019. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 99-124, July.
  14. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2011. "The case against lawyers’ contingent fees and the misapplication of principal-agent models," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 263-292, October.
  15. Friehe, Tim, 2010. "Contingent fees and legal expenses insurance: Comparison for varying defendant fault," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 283-290, December.
  16. Antill, Samuel & Grenadier, Steven R., 2023. "Financing the litigation arms race," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(2), pages 218-234.
  17. Cotten, Stephen J. & Santore, Rudy, 2012. "Contingent fee caps, screening, and the quality of legal services," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 317-328.
  18. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Contingent fees meet the British rule: an exploratory study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 499-510, March.
  19. At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015. "Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.
  20. Yannick Gabuthy & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2019. "Lawyer Fee Arrangements and Litigation Outcomes: An Auction-Theoretic Perspective," Working Papers of BETA 2019-03, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  21. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2015. "Self-regulation of the legal profession and quality in the market for legal services: an economic analysis of lawyers’ reputation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 431-449, April.
  22. Hyde, Charles E., 2006. "Conditional versus contingent fees: Litigation expenditure incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 180-194, June.
  23. Stone, Michael P. & Miceli, Thomas J., 2012. "Optimal attorney advertising," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 329-338.
  24. Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January.
  25. Joseph M. Fisher, 1988. "Contingent And Noncontingent Attorneys' Fees In Personal Injury Cases," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 6(3), pages 108-121, July.
  26. Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004. "The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2000. "The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 183-213, May.
  28. Lambert Eve-Angéline & Chappe Nathalie, 2014. "Litigation with Legal Aid versus Litigation with Contingent/Conditional Fees," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 95-115, March.
  29. Michael McKee & Rudy Santore & Joel Shelton, 2007. "Contingent Fees, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents: A Laboratory Experiment," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 253-273, June.
  30. Bradley Graham & Jack Robles, 2014. "Moral hazard and legal services contracts," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 219-230, September.
  31. Walter Simmons & Rosemarie Emanuele, 2004. "Male and Female Recoveries in Medical Malpractice Cases," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 62(1), pages 83-99.
  32. Yun-chien Chang & Su-hao Tu, 2020. "Two-way selection between flat-fee attorneys and litigants: theoretical and empirical analyses," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 131-164, February.
  33. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
  34. Yang Xi & Qiao Yue, 2019. "Judicial Reform in China: From the Perspective of Legal Fee Arrangements," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 1-10, December.
  35. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2015. "An attorney fee as a signal in pretrial negotiation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(1), pages 75-102, January.
  36. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
  37. Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Contingent fees and litigation settlement1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 295-317, September.
  38. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2007. "Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 351-361, September.
  39. Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, 2010. "Revisiting the Debate over Attorneys' Contingent Fees: A Behavioral Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 245-288, January.
  40. Amy Fanner & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Dispute Rates and Contingency Fees: An Analysis from the Signaling Model," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(3), pages 566-581, January.
  41. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013. "The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(2), pages 267-291, August.
  42. Baik Kyung Hwan, 2008. "Attorneys' Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 259-289, August.
  43. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  44. Brad Graham & Jack Robles, 2019. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 99-124, July.
  45. Ariell Reshef & Cailin Slattery, 2025. "Legislation, Regulation and Litigation: Demand for U.S. Legal Services in Historical Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 11661, CESifo.
  46. Emons, Winand, 2000. "Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 21-33, March.
  47. Kotzorek, Andreas, 1985. "Mehr Markt im Bereich der Ziviljustiz," Kiel Discussion Papers 107, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  48. Lerner, Josh, 1995. "Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 463-495, October.
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