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Optimal Long-term Contracting with Learning

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. , & ,, 2014. "Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
  2. Hu, Yang & House, Lisa A. & Gao, Zhifeng, 2022. "How do consumers respond to labels for crispr (gene-editing)?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
  3. Cetemen, Doruk & Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Urgun, Can, 2023. "Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  4. Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2016. "Robust Contracts in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1405-1440, July.
  5. Bhattacharjee, Swagata, 2022. "Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 534-552.
  6. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2017_015 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Gianmarco Bet & Francesco Dainelli & Eugenio Fabrizi, 2023. "The financial health of a company and the risk of its default: Back to the future," Papers 2302.10140, arXiv.org.
  8. Jakša Cvitanić & Xuhu Wan & Huali Yang, 2013. "Dynamics of Contract Design with Screening," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(5), pages 1229-1244, May.
  9. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
  10. Yaoyao Wu & Jinqiang Yang & Zhentao Zou, 2018. "Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 141-157, July.
  11. Vasama, Suvi, 2017. "On moral hazard and persistent private information," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 15/2017, Bank of Finland.
  12. Mohammad Abbas Rezaei, 2021. "Optimal Design of Limited Partnership Agreements," Papers 2104.07049, arXiv.org.
  13. Fichera, Eleonora & Banks, James & Siciliani, Luigi & Sutton, Matt, 2018. "Does patient health behaviour respond to doctor effort?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 225-251.
  14. Décamps, Jean-Paul & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2022. "Learning about profitability and dynamic cash management," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  15. Yu Huang & Nengjiu Ju & Hao Xing, 2023. "Performance Evaluation, Managerial Hedging, and Contract Termination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4953-4971, August.
  16. Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity," Working Papers 1022, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2019.
  17. Zsolt Bihary & P'eter Cs'oka & P'eter Ker'enyi & Alexander Szimayer, 2019. "Self-respecting worker in the precarious gig economy: A dynamic principal-agent model," Papers 1902.10021, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
  18. Jiajia Chang & Zhijun Hu & Hui Yang, 2020. "Venture Capital Contracting with Ambiguity Sharing and Effort Complementarity Effect," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(1), pages 1-16, January.
  19. Szydlowski, Martin & Yoon, Ji Hee, 2022. "Ambiguity in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
  20. Philipp Renner & Simon Scheidegger, 2017. "Machine learning for dynamic incentive problems," Working Papers 203620397, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  21. Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2019. "Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting: Moral Hazard and Dynamic Inconsistency," Working Papers 2019-17, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  22. Zhiguo He & Si Li & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu, 2014. "Uncertainty, Risk, and Incentives: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 206-226, January.
  23. Wang, Huan & Lai, Chong & Lai, Shaoyong, 2021. "A study on the incentive compensation structure with payroll tax: A continuous-time principal-agent model," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
  24. Sebastian Gryglewicz & Barney Hartman-Glaser & Geoffery Zheng, 2020. "Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay for Performance: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1248-1277, March.
  25. Vasama, Suvi, 2017. "On moral hazard and persistent private information," Research Discussion Papers 15/2017, Bank of Finland.
  26. Prat, Julien, 2014. "Dynamic Contracts and Learning by Doing," IZA Discussion Papers 7961, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  27. Huang, Minjie & Kubick, Thomas R. & Tseng, Kevin, 2021. "Technology spillovers and the duration of executive compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
  28. Fulghieri, Paolo & Dicks, David, 2021. "Uncertainty, Contracting, and Beliefs in Organizations," CEPR Discussion Papers 15378, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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