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Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wei Li, 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1136-1162, June.
  2. Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco, 2014. "Dissent in monetary policy decisions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-154.
  3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7718 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Ying Chen, 2015. "Career Concerns and Excessive Risk Taking," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 110-130, March.
  5. Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2012. "When second opinions hurt: A model of expert advice under career concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 1-16.
  6. Partha Gangopadhyay, 2011. "Decision Making in Ignorance and Consequent Market Outcomes: Equilibrium Analysis," Modern Applied Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 5(3), pages 1-3, June.
  7. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2018. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(10), pages 3057-3103, October.
  8. FU, Qiang & LI, Ming, 2010. "Policy Making with Reputation Concerns," Cahiers de recherche 09-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  9. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2012. "Communication and Learning," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 419-450.
  10. Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "Imperfect memory and choice under risk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 127-158.
  11. Tomoya Tajika, 2021. "Persistent and snap decision‐making," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 203-227, February.
  12. Pavesi, Filippo & Scotti, Massimo, 2022. "Good lies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    • Filippo Pavesi & Massimo Scotti, 2019. "Good Lies," Working Paper Series 39, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
  13. Li, Wei, 2010. "Signaling drive over the long term," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(3), pages 164-167, December.
  14. Li Hao & Wei Li, 2013. "Misinformation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(1), pages 253-277, February.
  15. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  16. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
  17. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 31-53, January.
  18. Wei Li, 2012. "Well‐Informed Intermediaries In Strategic Communication," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 380-398, April.
  19. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
  20. Dasgupta, Amil & Sarafidis, Yianis, 2009. "Managers as administrators: Reputation and incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 155-163, May.
  21. Chen Li & Uyanga Turmunkh & Peter P. Wakker, 2019. "Trust as a decision under ambiguity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(1), pages 51-75, March.
  22. Schmidt, Robert J., 2019. "Capitalizing on the (false) consensus effect: Two tractable methods to elicit private information," Working Papers 0669, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  23. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.
  24. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2021. "Private vs. public communication: Difference of opinion and reputational concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
  25. Stefan T. Trautmann & Gijs Kuilen, 2015. "Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race among Truth Serums," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(589), pages 2116-2135, December.
  26. Aurélien Baillon & Laure Cabantous & Peter Wakker, 2012. "Aggregating imprecise or conflicting beliefs: An experimental investigation using modern ambiguity theories," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 115-147, April.
  27. Junichiro Ishida, 2010. "Vision and Flexibility in a Model of Cognitive Dissonance," ISER Discussion Paper 0771, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
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