IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions"

by Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," Working Papers 1378, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  2. Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1423, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Anatolyev, Stanislav & Kosenok, Grigory, 2009. "Tests in contingency tables as regression tests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 189-192, November.
  5. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Faure-Grimaud, A. & Reiche, S., 2006. "Dynamic yardstick mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 316-335, February.
  7. Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001242, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Aggregation of Expert Opinions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000548, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 147-165.
  11. Colin Campbell, 2005. "Let Them Burn Money: Making Elections More Informative," Departmental Working Papers 200512, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  12. Claudio Mezzetti, 2007. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(3), pages 473-488, June.
  13. Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John H. & Zeckhauser, Richard & Johnson, Scott, 2006. "Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series rwp06-028, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  14. Kosenok, Grigory & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 126-161, May.
  15. Johnson, Scott & Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003. "Efficient Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types, and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series rwp03-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.