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Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dubra, Juan & Caffera, Marcelo & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide," MPRA Paper 75721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2008. "Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 1023-1057, December.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 319-324, May.
  4. repec:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0993-0 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Faure-Grimaud, A. & Reiche, S., 2006. "Dynamic yardstick mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 316-335.
  6. Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2009. "Aggregation of expert opinions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 339-371, March.
  7. Philippe Jehiel & Morita Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "Posterior Implementation Versus Ex-Post Implementation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 838, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Fang, Hanming & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Multidimensional private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 1-30, January.
  9. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2008. "Ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 527-566.
  10. Michael P. Keane & Kenneth I. Wolpin, 2007. "Exploring The Usefulness Of A Nonrandom Holdout Sample For Model Validation: Welfare Effects On Female Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1351-1378, November.
  11. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2006. "The Limits of ex post Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 585-610.
  12. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September.
  13. Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 147-165.
  14. Claudio Mezzetti, 2007. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(3), pages 473-488, June.
  15. Johnson, Scott & Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003. "Efficient Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types, and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series rwp03-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  16. Widmer, Tobias & Leukel, Joerg, 2016. "Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, pages 856-868.
  17. William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 703-725, December.
  18. repec:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:474-488 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2006. "The Limits of ex post Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 585-610, May.
  20. Anatolyev, Stanislav & Kosenok, Grigory, 2009. "Tests in contingency tables as regression tests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, pages 189-192.
  21. Kosenok, Grigory & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 126-161.
  22. repec:the:publsh:2234 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Postlewaite, Andrew & McLean, Richard, 2015. "Implementation with interdependent valuations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  24. Colin Campbell, 2005. "Let Them Burn Money: Making Elections More Informative," Departmental Working Papers 200512, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  25. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  26. Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Pierre Pestieau, 2008. "Pensions with heterogenous individuals and endogenous fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, pages 961-981.
  27. Miller, Nolan H. & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Johnson, Scott, 2007. "Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 476-496, September.
  28. Dubra, Juan & Caffera, Marcelo & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide," MPRA Paper 75721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  29. McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2017. "A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 34-48.
  30. Anatolyev, Stanislav & Kosenok, Grigory, 2009. "Tests in contingency tables as regression tests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 189-192, November.
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