Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

Citations

Cited by:

1. Faure-Grimaud, A. & Reiche, S., 2006. "Dynamic yardstick mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 316-335, February.
2. Song, Yangwei, 2023. "Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 56-87.
3. Aristotelis Boukouras & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2015. "Efficient Allocations in Economies with Asymmetric Information when the Realized Frequency of Types is Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/04, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
4. Claudio Mezzetti, 2007. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(3), pages 473-488, June.
   • Claudio Mezzetti, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction," Discussion Papers in Economics 05/1, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Mar 2006.
5. Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2009. "Aggregation of expert opinions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 339-371, March.
   • Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Aggregation of Expert Opinions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Aggregation of Expert Opinions," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
6. , J. & ,, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2005.
   • Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
7. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   • Jehiel, Philippe & moldovanu, benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
8. Song, Yangwei, 2018. "Efficient Implementation with Interdependent Valuations and Maxmin Agents," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 92, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
9. Daske, Thomas & March, Christoph, 2022. "Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences," EconStor Preprints 254263, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
   • Daske, Thomas & March, Christoph, 2022. "Efficient incentives with social preferences," BERG Working Paper Series 180, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
   • Thomas Daske & Christoph March, 2022. "Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences," CESifo Working Paper Series 9784, CESifo.
10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 319-324, May.
    • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," Working Papers 1378, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1846, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000427, David K. Levine.
11. Aristotelis Boukouras & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2017. "Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(1), pages 75-98, June.
12. Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 147-165.
13. Pasha Andreyanov & El Hadi Caoui, 2022. "Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), pages 1203-1256, July.
14. Johnson, Scott & Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003. "Efficient Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types, and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series rwp03-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
15. Huang, Xuesong, 2021. "Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 100-135.
16. Kosenok, Grigory & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 126-161, May.
17. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
18. Colin Campbell, 2005. "Let Them Burn Money: Making Elections More Informative," Departmental Working Papers 200512, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
19. Caffera, Marcelo & Dubra, Juan & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2018. "Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 56-61.
    • Dubra, Juan & Caffera, Marcelo & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide," MPRA Paper 75721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Marcelo Caffera & Juan Dubra & Nicolás Figueroa, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players´ preferences and information coincide," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1603, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
20. McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2017. "A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 34-48.
21. Song, Yangwei, 2022. "Approximate Bayesian Implementation and Exact Maxmin Implementation: An Equivalence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 362, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
22. Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng & Yu, Haomiao, 2020. "The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
23. Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 9, pages 319-356, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Fang, Hanming & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Multidimensional private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 1-30, January.
    • Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1423, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Theory workshop papers 121473000000000021, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm387, Yale School of Management.
    • Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 174, Econometric Society.
24. , & ,, 2015. "Implementation with interdependent valuations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
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    • Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001242, UCLA Department of Economics.
25. Song, Yangwei, 2018. "Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 693-726.
26. Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018. "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 708-733.
27. Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng & Wu, Lei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017. "Equilibria and incentives in private information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 474-488.
28. Miller, Nolan H. & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Johnson, Scott, 2007. "Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 476-496, September.
    • Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John H. & Zeckhauser, Richard & Johnson, Scott, 2006. "Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series rwp06-028, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
29. Guo, Huiyi, 2019. "Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: An analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 76-105.
30. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2006. "The Limits of ex post Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 585-610, May.
    • Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 839, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William B. Zame, 2006. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," Post-Print halshs-00754157, HAL.
    • Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000548, UCLA Department of Economics.
31. Heumann, Tibor, 2019. "An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
32. Widmer, Tobias & Leukel, Joerg, 2016. "Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 255(3), pages 856-868.
33. Tatiana Daddario & Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023. "An Assignment Problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities," Papers 2305.01477, arXiv.org.