Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction
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- Claudio Mezzetti, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction," Discussion Papers in Economics 05/1, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Mar 2006.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2016. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 166-173.
- Papakonstantinou, A. & Rogers, A & Gerding, E. H. & Jennings, N. R., 2010. "Mechanism Design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in Distributed Information Systems," MPRA Paper 43324, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
KeywordsAuctions; Surplus extraction; Interdependent valuations; Mechanism design; D44; D82;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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