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Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders

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  • Moez Bennouri

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  • Sonia Falconieri

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Abstract

The paper analyzes a problem of optimal auction design when the seller faces asymmetrically informed bidders. Specifically, we consider a continuum of risk-neutral uninformed bidders taking part into the auction along with n risk-averse informed bidders. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we fully characterize the optimal auction in this non standard environment and in a very general set-up. We find that when informed bidders reveal “bad news” about the value of the good, the seller optimally awards the object to the uninformed bidders. Secondly, we show that the seller is better off in presence of uninformed bidders because this allows to lower the informational rents paid to the informed bidders. Last, we find that, with bi-lateral risk neutrality, the seller always awards the good to the uninformed bidders thereby keeping all the surplus. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Moez Bennouri & Sonia Falconieri, 2006. "Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 585-602, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:3:p:585-602
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0637-2
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-005-0637-2
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Moez Bennouri & Sonia Falconieri, 2005. "Optimal Rationing in IPOs with Risk Averse Institutional Investors," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 95(4), pages 3-29, July-Augu.
    2. Claudio Mezzetti, 2007. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(3), pages 473-488, June.
    3. Fabrice Rousseau & Sarah Parlane, 2009. "Optimal Initial Public O¤ering design with aftermarket trading," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n2041109.pdf, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
    4. Muñoz-García, Félix & Orozco-Alemán, Sandra, 2011. "Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: A "desensitizer" from uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 38-41, July.

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