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Optimal Initial Public O¤ering design with aftermarket trading

  • Fabrice Rousseau

    ()

    (Economics, National University of Ireland, Maynooth)

  • Sarah Parlane

    ()

    (University College Dublin)

We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated to those who trade strategically in the after-market.

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File URL: http://repec.maynoothuniversity.ie/mayecw-files/N2041109.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth in its series Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series with number n2041109.pdf.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n2041109.pdf
Contact details of provider: Postal: Maynooth, Co. Kildare
Phone: 353-1-7083728
Fax: 353-1-7083934
Web page: http://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/economics-finance-and-accounting

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  1. Ellis, Katrina, 2006. "Who trades IPOs? A close look at the first days of trading," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 339-363, February.
  2. Moez Bennouri & Sonia Falconieri, 2006. "Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 585-602, 08.
  3. Chen, Zhaohui & Wilhelm Jr., William J., 2008. "A theory of the transition to secondary market trading of IPOs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 219-236, December.
  4. Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano, 2003. "IPO underpricing and after-market liquidity," CSEF Working Papers 99, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Feb 2006.
  5. Sherman, Ann E, 2000. "IPOs and Long-Term Relationships: An Advantage of Book Building," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 697-714.
  6. Biais, Bruno & Faugeron-Crouzet, Anne-Marie, 2000. "IPO Auctions: English, Dutch, ... French and Internet," IDEI Working Papers 104, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  7. Peng, Lin, 2005. "Learning with Information Capacity Constraints," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(02), pages 307-329, June.
  8. Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2003. "Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 337-386, December.
  9. Libby, Robert & Bloomfield, Robert & Nelson, Mark W., 2002. "Experimental research in financial accounting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 775-810, November.
  10. Boehmer, Beatrice & Boehmer, Ekkehart & Fishe, Raymond P. H., 2006. "Do Institutions Receive Favorable Allocations in IPOs with Better Long-Run Returns?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(04), pages 809-828, December.
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