Free Riding, Shirking, and Team Production in Legal Partnerships
Citations
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Cited by:
- De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2019.
"Free-riding and knowledge spillovers in teams: The role of social ties,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 74-90.
- Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2016. "Free-Riding And Knowledge Spillovers In Teams: The Role Of Social Ties," Working Papers 201609, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
- De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2016. "Free-Riding and Knowledge Spillovers in Teams: The Role of Social Ties," IZA Discussion Papers 10257, IZA Network @ LISER.
- Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2018. "Free-riding and knowledge spillovers in teams: The role of social ties," Natural Field Experiments 00704, The Field Experiments Website.
- Richard B. Freeman & Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi, 2010.
"Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism,"
NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 77-103,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richard Freeman & Douglas Kruse & Joseph Blasi, 2008. "Worker Responses To Shirking Under Shared Capitalism," NBER Working Papers 14227, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Stephen Rassenti, 2011. "Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations," Working Papers 11-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003.
"Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability?,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(3), pages 253-272, November.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00180439, HAL.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?," Post-Print halshs-00179979, HAL.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Post-Print halshs-00180439, HAL.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00179979, HAL.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Post-Print halshs-00175255, HAL.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00175255, HAL.
- Landeo, Claudia M. & Spier, Kathryn E., 2015.
"Incentive contracts for teams: Experimental evidence,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 496-511.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 53, Peruvian Economic Association.
- Claudia Landeo & Kathryn Spier, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2015-09, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- Paz Espinosa, Maria & Macho-Stadler, Ines, 2003.
"Endogenous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 183-194, July.
- Mar? Paz Espinosa & Inés Macho-Stadler, "undated". "Endogenous Formation Of Partnerships With Moral Hazard," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 448.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Macho Stadler, Inés, 2002. "Endogenous Formation of Competing Partnership with Moral Hazard," DFAEII Working Papers 1988-088X, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Mari Paz Espinosa & Inez Macho-Stadler, 2000. "Endogenous Formation of Partnership with Moral Hazard," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0565, Econometric Society.
- Rankin, Frederick W. & Sayre, Todd L., 2000. "The effects of performance separability and contract type on agent effort," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 25(7), pages 683-695, October.
- Brice Corgnet, 2012.
"Peer Evaluations And Team Performance: When Friends Do Worse Than Strangers,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(1), pages 171-181, January.
- Brice Corgnet, 2009. "Peer Evaluations and Team Performance: When Friends Do Worse Than Strangers," Faculty Working Papers 12/09, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
- Brice Corgnet, 2012. "Peer Evaluations and Team Performance : When Friends Do Worse Than Strangers," Post-Print hal-02311960, HAL.
- Philip Babcock & Kelly Bedard & Gary Charness & John Hartman & Heather Royer, 2011. "Letting Down the Team? Evidence of Social Effects of Team Incentives," NBER Working Papers 16687, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Courey, Gabriel & Heywood, John S. & McGinty, Matthew, 2021. "Ownership shares and choosing the best leader," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 482-500.
- Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
- Scott A. Imberman & Michael F. Lovenheim, 2015.
"Incentive Strength and Teacher Productivity: Evidence from a Group-Based Teacher Incentive Pay System,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 364-386, May.
- Scott A. Imberman & Michael F. Lovenheim, 2012. "Incentive Strength and Teacher Productivity: Evidence from a Group-Based Teacher Incentive Pay System," NBER Working Papers 18439, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan H.W. Tan & Friedel Bolle, 2019. "Intergroup conflict aversion weakens intragroup cooperation," Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series 1904, Nanyang Technological University, School of Social Sciences, Economic Growth Centre.
- Martin Gaynor, 1986. "Internal Non-Price Competition, Pricing, and Incentive Systems in the Cooperative Service Firm: The Case of US Medical Group Practice," NBER Working Papers 1866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Gaynor & Mark Pauly, 1987. "Alternative Compensation Arrangements and Productive Efficiency in Partnerships: Evidence from Medical Group Practice," NBER Working Papers 2170, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nana Adrian & Marc M ller, 2019. "Partnerships with Asymmetric Information: The Benefit of Sharing Equally amongst Unequals," Diskussionsschriften dp1904, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Kidwell, Roland E. & Nygaard, Arne & Silkoset, Ragnhild, 2007. "Antecedents and effects of free riding in the franchisor-franchisee relationship," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 522-544, July.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
- W. Bradford & Robert Martin, 2000. "Partnerships, Profit Sharing, and Quality Competition in the Medical Profession," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 17(2), pages 193-208, September.
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
- Marion Brivot, 2007. "Le Contrôle De L'Utilisation Des Connaissances Organisationnelles Dans Les Firmes De Services Professionnels," Post-Print halshs-00543210, HAL.
- Kruse, Douglas & Blasi, Joseph & Freeman, Richard B., 2004.
"Monitoring colleagues at work: profit-sharing, employee ownership, broad-based stock options and workplace performance in the United States,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
19943, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Joseph Blasi & Richard Freeman & Douglas Kruse, 2004. "Monitoring Colleagues at Work: Profit-Sharing, Employee Ownership, Broad-Based Stock Options and Workplace Performance in the United States," CEP Discussion Papers dp0647, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Richard B. Freeman, 2008.
"When Workers Share in Profits: Effort and Responses to Shirking,"
'Angelo Costa' Lectures Serie, SIPI Spa, issue Lect. IX.
- Richard B. Freeman, 2007. "When Workers Share in Profits: Effort and Responses to Shirking," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 97(6), pages 9-36, November-.
- Freeman, Richard B., 2008. "When workers share in profits: effort and responses to shirking," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28499, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Richard Freeman, 2008. "When Workers Share in Profits: Effort and Responses to Shirking," CEP Discussion Papers dp0882, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Canice Prendergast, 1996. "What Happens Within Firms? A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Compensation Policies," NBER Working Papers 5802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Olumekor & Hossam Haddad & Nidal Mahmoud Al-Ramahi, 2023. "The Relationship between Search Engines and Entrepreneurship Development: A Granger-VECM Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-16, March.
- Burrows, Geoff & Black, Christopher, 1998. "Profit sharing in Australian Big 6 accounting firms: An exploratory study," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 23(5-6), pages 517-530.
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