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Citations for "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions"

by Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite

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  1. Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya, 2014. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  2. Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.
  3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2013. "Auction Design Without Commitment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 316-342, 04.
  4. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
  5. Agastya, Murali & Menezes, Flavio & Sengupta, Kunal, 2007. "Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-19, July.
  6. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2009. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 182-206, February.
  7. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  8. Ying Chen, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Gerardi, Dino & Hörner, Johannes & Maestri, Lucas, 2014. "The role of commitment in bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 578-603.
  10. Campbell, Colin M., 1998. "Coordination in Auctions with Entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 425-450, October.
  11. Suvorov Anton & Tsybuleva Natalia, 2010. "Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-35, November.
  12. R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case," ESE Discussion Papers 125, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  13. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2013. "Informational loss in bundled bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 338-362, July.
  14. Valentin Goranko & Paolo Turrini, 2016. "Two-Player Preplay Negotiation Games with Conditional Offers," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(01), pages 1550017-01 .
  15. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369.
  16. Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2014. "For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 173-199, June.
  17. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2013. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Working Papers E1304E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  18. Lavi, Ron & Oren, Sigal, 2012. "Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 439-456.
  19. Saran, Rene, 2012. "How Naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 311-314.
  20. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2005. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 467-500, October.
  21. Saran, Rene, 2011. "Bilateral trading with naive traders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 544-557, June.
  22. Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004. "Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
  23. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics.
  24. Gayer Gabrielle & Segev Ella, 2012. "Revealing Private Information in Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-34, December.
  25. repec:dpr:wpaper:0746 is not listed on IDEAS
  26. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information," Discussion Papers 13-01r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  27. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
  28. Richard McAdams & Janice Nadler, "undated". "A Third Model of Legal Compliance: Testing for Expressive Effects in a Hawk/Dove Game," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1029, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
  29. Lucie Ménager, 2015. "Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden," Working Papers hal-00856078, HAL.
  30. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2015. "Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 14-25.
  31. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2012. "The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2897-2922, October.
  32. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
  33. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-153/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  34. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society.
  35. Ganguly, Chirantan & Ray, Indrajit, 2015. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Game with Two-Sided Private Information," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2015/7, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  36. Yilankaya, Okan, 1999. "A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 267-271, July.
  37. Hong, Lu, 1998. "Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 201-221, June.
  38. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
  39. Valley, Kathleen & Thompson, Leigh & Gibbons, Robert & Bazerman, Max H., 2002. "How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 127-155, January.
  40. Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
  41. Flesch, János & Schröder, Marc & Vermeulen, Dries, 2016. "Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 68-75.
  42. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-055/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.