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Citations for "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions"

by Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite

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  1. Saran, Rene, 2012. "How Naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 311-314.
  2. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2015. "Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-012/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. Anton Suvorov & Natalia Tsybuleva, 2008. "Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?," Working Papers w0121, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  4. Mitusch, Kay & Strausz, Roland, 2004. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 24, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  5. repec:dpr:wpaper:0746 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri, 2010. "The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1760R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2013.
  7. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  8. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-153/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  9. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2012. "The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2897-2922, October.
  10. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
  11. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society.
  12. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000005, www.najecon.org.
  13. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2014. "A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement," MPRA Paper 53504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2014. "For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 173-199, June.
  15. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  16. Ying Chen, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  17. Campbell, Colin M., 1998. "Coordination in Auctions with Entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 425-450, October.
  18. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-055/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
  19. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998. "- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  20. Lucie Ménager, 2015. "Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden," Working Papers hal-00856078, HAL.
  21. R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case," ESE Discussion Papers 125, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  22. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2009. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 182-206, February.
  23. Valley, Kathleen & Thompson, Leigh & Gibbons, Robert & Bazerman, Max H., 2002. "How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 127-155, January.
  24. Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.
  25. Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan, 2012. "Informational Loss in Bundled Bargaining," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1234, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  26. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
  27. Saran, Rene, 2011. "Bilateral trading with naive traders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 544-557, June.
  28. Richard McAdams & Janice Nadler, . "A Third Model of Legal Compliance: Testing for Expressive Effects in a Hawk/Dove Game," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1029, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
  29. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," Economics Working Paper Archive 563, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  30. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information," Discussion Papers 13-01r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  31. Murali Agastya & Flavio Menezes & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Cheap talk, Efficiency and Egalitarian Cost Sharing In Joint Projects," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000551, David K. Levine.
  32. Lavi, Ron & Oren, Sigal, 2012. "Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 439-456.
  33. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics.
  34. Ganguly, Chirantan & Ray, Indrajit, 2015. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Game with Two-Sided Private Information," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2015/7, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  35. Hong, Lu, 1998. "Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 201-221, June.
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