IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!)

Citations for "Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games"

by Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as
in new window

  1. Gines, M. & Marhuenda, F., 2000. "Welfarism in Economic Domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 191-204, August.
  2. Dominik Karos, 2015. "Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utilities and externalities," Economics Series Working Papers 741, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2006. "Voice and Bargaining Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 1668, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Chun, Youngsub, 2004. "On weighted Kalai-Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 257-267, May.
  5. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2006. "Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory," Post-Print halshs-00150523, HAL.
  6. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2010. "Bargaining cum Voice," CEPR Discussion Papers 7774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Yan-An Hwang, 2009. "An NTU value under complement reduced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 305-324, November.
  8. Yves Richelle & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "Exit, sunk costs and the selection of firms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 643-670.
  9. Hwang, Yan-An, 2010. "Marginal monotonicity solution of NTU games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 502-508, November.
  10. Ok, Efe A. & Zhou, Lin, 1997. "The Choquet Bargaining Solutions," Working Papers 97-36, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  11. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "The Harsanyi paradox and the 'right to talk' in bargaining among coalitions," Game Theory and Information 0501005, EconWPA.
  12. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2010. "Monotonicity of social welfare optima," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 392-402, November.
  13. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2015. "Strategic disclosure of feasible options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 145-165.
  14. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  15. repec:spr:compst:v:64:y:2006:i:3:p:557-568 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Yan-An Hwang, 2006. "Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 64(3), pages 557-568, December.
  17. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  18. Nelson, Julianne, 1995. "Fairness, efficiency and externalities," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 85-103, May.
  19. M. Hinojosa & E. Romero-Palacios & J. Zarzuelo, 2015. "Consistency of the Shapley NTU value in G-hyperplane games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(4), pages 259-278, December.
  20. Gustavo Bergantiños & Balbina Casas- Méndez & Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure," Game Theory and Information 0511006, EconWPA.
  21. Kamijo, Yoshio & Kongo, Takumi, 2012. "Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 638-646.
  22. Boragan Aruoba, S. & Rocheteau, Guillaume & Waller, Christopher, 2007. "Bargaining and the value of money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2636-2655, November.
  23. Bergantinos, G. & Casas-Mendez, B. & Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G. & Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2007. "A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 35-58, July.
  24. Miguel Ginés Vilar & Francisco Marhuenda Hurtado, 1998. "Welfarism in specific economic domain," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  25. Barry Feldman, 2002. "A Dual Model of Cooperative Value," Game Theory and Information 0207001, EconWPA.
  26. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel De Lara & Héctor Ramírez Cabrera, 2011. "Bargaining with intertemporal maximin payoffs," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-7, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  27. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2004. "Bargaining, Voting, And Value," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  28. Hinojosa, M.A. & Romero, E. & Zarzuelo, J.M., 2012. "Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU configuration value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 665-677.
  29. Barry O'Neill, 2014. "Networks of Rights in Conflict: A Talmudic Example," Discussion Paper Series dp677, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  30. Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena, 2017. "Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 197-220, January.
  31. Calleja, Pere & Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2016. "Consistency distinguishes the (weighted) Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division value and the prenucleolus," Working Papers 2072/266577, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  32. Elaine Bennett, 1986. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," UCLA Economics Working Papers 594, UCLA Department of Economics.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.