IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/hal/journl/halshs-01206167.html

On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020. "Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides," QM&ET Working Papers 20-1, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
  2. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2019. "Poisson voting games: proportional rule," Working Papers 11/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
  4. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
  5. Cappelletti, Matilde & Giuffrida, Leonardo M., 2022. "Targeted bidders in government tenders," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  6. Seung Han Yoo, 2020. "Optimal Influence Sale," Discussion Paper Series 2002, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  7. Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation [Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2149-2178.
  8. Barbosa, Klenio & Boyer, Pierre C., 2021. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
  9. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2023. "Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 377-399, April.
  10. Robert Marquez & Rajdeep Singh, 2024. "Selling Assets: Are Sellers Better Off with Strong Buyers?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(9), pages 5731-5752, September.
  11. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2025. "To discriminate or not to discriminate: how to enforce unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 146(2), pages 237-262, October.
  12. Chen, Jiafeng & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2021. "Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  13. Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei, 2021. "Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 155-178.
  14. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7pu0mfr14h9ba9rsrotsskha8c is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Chiappinelli, Olga & Seres, Gyula, 2024. "Optimal discounts in green public procurement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
  16. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, "undated". "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
  17. Philippe Bontems & Marie-Françoise Calmette & David Martimort, 2025. "Highway to Sell," Working Papers hal-05143577, HAL.
  18. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2022. "Poisson voting games under proportional rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 507-526, April.
  19. Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020. "Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  20. Bo Chen & Dmitriy Knyazev, 2026. "Optimal Discrimination-Free Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 72(3), pages 2267-2283, March.
  21. Cole, Matthew T. & Davies, Ronald B. & Kaplan, Todd, 2017. "Protection in government procurement auctions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 134-142.
  22. Pierre-Henri Morand & François Marechal, 2023. "Achats publics responsables et achat local : enseignements des données ouvertes françaises," Post-Print hal-03842464, HAL.
  23. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Marking to Market versus Taking to Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(8), pages 2246-2276, August.
  24. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2024. "On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 63-90.
  25. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.
  26. Agastya, Murali & Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.