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Dynamic sender-receiver games
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Cited by:
- Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018.
"Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
- Juan F. Escobar & Gastón Llanes, 2015. "Cooperation Dynamic in Repeated Games of Adverse Selection," Documentos de Trabajo 311, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2015.
"Approximate implementation in Markovian environments,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 401-442.
- Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," HEC Research Papers Series 1015, HEC Paris.
- Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," Working Papers hal-02058241, HAL.
- Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
- Harry Pei, 2020. "Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost," Papers 2006.08069, arXiv.org.
- Alex Bloedel & R. Vijay Krishna & Oksana Leukhina, 2018. "Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information," Working Papers 2018-020, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 11 Aug 2024.
- Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif, 2020.
"Starting small to communicate,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 265-296.
- Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2018. "Starting Small to Communicate," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1805, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019.
"Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
- Christoph Schottmüller, 2016. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Discussion Papers 16-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017.
"Optimal dynamic information provision,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 329-349.
- Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal Dynamic Information Provision," TSE Working Papers 17-749, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2018.
"Dynamic communication with biased senders,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 330-339.
- Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2017. "Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders," MPRA Paper 84134, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea, 2014.
"Dynamic strategic information transmission,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 304-341.
- Mikhail Golosov, 2009. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," 2009 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 11-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1802, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2013. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 13-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," EIEF Working Papers Series 1110, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2011.
- Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2016. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 49-71, February.
- Aradhye, Aditya & Flesch, János & Staudigl, Mathias & Vermeulen, Dries, 2023.
"Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 303-320.
- Aditya Aradhye & J'anos Flesch & Mathias Staudigl & Dries Vermeulen, 2020. "Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games," Papers 2004.01910, arXiv.org.
- Chen, Yi, 2022. "Dynamic delegation with a persistent state," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
- Aïd, René & Bonesini, Ofelia & Callegaro, Giorgia & Campi, Luciano, 2025. "Continuous-time persuasion by filtering," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 127889, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- James Best & Daniel Quigley, 2016. "Persuasion for the Long-Run," Economics Papers 2016-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Kawamura, Kohei & Le Quement, Mark T., 2023. "News credibility and the quest for clicks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
- Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2024. "Designing Social Learning," Papers 2405.05744, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2025.
- Kuvalekar, Aditya & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2022. "Goodwill in communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
- Arnold Polanski & Mark Quement, 2023. "The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 463-483, June.
- Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
- Vora, Anuj S. & Kulkarni, Ankur A., 2024. "Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 48-66.
- Zeinab Aboutalebi & Ayush Pant, 2021. "Believe ... and you are there. On Self-Confidence and Feedback," Working Papers 64, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
- David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer & Tao Wang, 2025. "Comparison of Oracles," Papers 2505.15955, arXiv.org, revised May 2025.
- Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
- ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
- Meng, Delong, 2021. "On the value of repetition for communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 227-246.