Dynamic sender-receiver games

Citations

Cited by:

1. Aradhye, Aditya & Flesch, János & Staudigl, Mathias & Vermeulen, Dries, 2023. "Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 303-320.
   • Aditya Aradhye & J'anos Flesch & Mathias Staudigl & Dries Vermeulen, 2020. "Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games," Papers 2004.01910, arXiv.org.
2. Kawamura, Kohei & Le Quement, Mark T., 2023. "News credibility and the quest for clicks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
3. Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea, 2014. "Dynamic strategic information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 304-341.
   • Mikhail Golosov, 2009. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," 2009 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   • Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2013. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 13-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
   • Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 11-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
   • Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1802, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
   • Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," EIEF Working Papers Series 1110, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2011.
4. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2015. "Approximate implementation in Markovian environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 401-442.
   • Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," Working Papers hal-02058241, HAL.
   • Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," HEC Research Papers Series 1015, HEC Paris.
5. Arnold Polanski & Mark Quement, 2023. "The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 463-483, June.
6. Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2018. "Dynamic communication with biased senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 330-339.
   • Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2017. "Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders," MPRA Paper 84134, University Library of Munich, Germany.
7. Vora, Anuj S. & Kulkarni, Ankur A., 2024. "Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 48-66.
8. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
   • Juan F. Escobar & Gastón Llanes, 2015. "Cooperation Dynamic in Repeated Games of Adverse Selection," Documentos de Trabajo 311, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
9. Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif, 2020. "Starting small to communicate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 265-296.
   • Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2018. "Starting Small to Communicate," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1805, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
10. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
    • Christoph Schottmüller, 2016. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Discussion Papers 16-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
11. Chen, Yi, 2022. "Dynamic delegation with a persistent state," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
12. James Best & Daniel Quigley, 2016. "Persuasion for the Long-Run," Economics Papers 2016-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
13. Zeinab Aboutalebi & Ayush Pant, 2021. "Believe ... and you are there. On Self-Confidence and Feedback," Working Papers 64, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
14. David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer & Tao Wang, 2025. "Comparison of Oracles," Papers 2505.15955, arXiv.org, revised May 2025.
15. ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
16. Meng, Delong, 2021. "On the value of repetition for communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 227-246.
17. Alex Bloedel & R. Vijay Krishna & Oksana Leukhina, 2018. "Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information," Working Papers 2018-020, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 11 Aug 2024.
18. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2016. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 49-71, February.
19. Aïd, René & Bonesini, Ofelia & Callegaro, Giorgia & Campi, Luciano, 2025. "Continuous-time persuasion by filtering," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 127889, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
20. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2024. "Designing Social Learning," Papers 2405.05744, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2025.
21. Kuvalekar, Aditya & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2022. "Goodwill in communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
22. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
23. Harry Pei, 2020. "Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost," Papers 2006.08069, arXiv.org.
24. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal dynamic information provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 329-349.
    • Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal Dynamic Information Provision," TSE Working Papers 17-749, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
25. Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
26. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.