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Positive value of information in games

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Mark Whitmeyer, 2020. "In Simple Communication Games, When Does Ex Ante Fact-Finding Benefit the Receiver?," Papers 2001.09387, arXiv.org.
  2. Karray, Salma & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar & Zaccour, Georges, 2020. "Pricing of demand-related products: Can ignoring cross-category effect be a smart choice?," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
  3. Elie Appelbaum & Mark Melatos, 2014. "Option Values and the Choice of Trade Agreements," Working Papers 2014_1, York University, Department of Economics.
  4. Promit Kanti Chaudhuri, 2021. "Strategic inattention and divisionalization in duopoly," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2021-020, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
  6. Taizhong Hu & Alfred Müller & Marco Scarsini, 2002. "Some Counterexamples in Positive Dependence," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 28-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research, revised Jul 2003.
  7. K.J.M. De Jaegher, 2012. "The value of private information in the physician-patient relationship: a gametheoretic account," Working Papers 12-23, Utrecht School of Economics.
  8. Fujii, Tomoki & Ishikawa, Ryuichiro, 2012. "Quasi-option value under strategic interactions," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 36-54.
  9. Müller, Alfred & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "Archimedean copulæ and positive dependence," Journal of Multivariate Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 434-445, April.
  10. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah, 2006. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 343-357, June.
  11. Kandel, Emanuel & Mugerman, Yevgeny & Winter, Eyal, 2025. "Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 401-414.
  12. Dughmi, Shaddin, 2019. "On the hardness of designing public signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 609-625.
  13. Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2016. "Rule Rationality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 997-1026, August.
  14. Antonio Lijoi & Igor Prünster & Stephen G. Walker, 2004. "On rates of convergence for posterior distributions in infinite–dimensional models," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 24-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  15. Bernard de Meyer & Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009. "Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides," Post-Print halshs-00390625, HAL.
  16. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah, 2010. "A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 393-399, July.
  17. Antonio Lijoi & Igor Prünster & Stephen G. Walker, 2004. "Contributions to the understanding of Bayesian consistency," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 13-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  18. L. Picci, 2007. "The Reputational Budget and its Uses," Working Papers 587, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  19. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2010. "Signaling and mediation in games with common interests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 670-682, March.
  20. Kloosterman, Andrew, 2015. "Public information in Markov games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 28-48.
  21. Gossner, Olivier, 2010. "Ability and knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 95-106, May.
  22. Ui, Takashi & Yoshizawa, Yasunori, 2015. "Characterizing social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 507-535.
  23. Yanling Chang & Alan Erera & Chelsea White, 2015. "Value of information for a leader–follower partially observed Markov game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 235(1), pages 129-153, December.
  24. Takashi Ui, 2009. "Bayesian potentials and information structures: Team decision problems revisited," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 5(3), pages 271-291, September.
  25. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca & Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., 2020. "Strategic inattention, delegation and endogenous market structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
  26. Antonio Lijoi & Igor Prünster & Stephen G. Walker, 2004. "On consistency of nonparametric normal mixtures for Bayesian density estimation," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 23-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  27. Cédric Wanko, 2018. "A Unique and Stable $$\hbox {Se}{\mathcal {C}}\hbox {ure}$$ Se C ure Reversion Protocol Improving Efficiency: A Computational Bayesian Approach for Empirical Analysis," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(1), pages 1-23, June.
  28. Hörtnagl, Tanja & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Stracke, Rudi, 2019. "Competing for market shares: Does the order of moves matter even when it shouldn’t?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 346-365.
  29. Antoine Billot & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Bernard Walliser, 2008. "Multiplayer belief revision," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne v08067, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  30. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini & G. I. P. Ottaviano, 2015. "To Know or Not To Know: Strategic Inattention and Endogenous Market Structure," Working Papers wp987, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  31. Bernard De Meyer & Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2010. "Evaluating Information in Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 35(4), pages 851-863, November.
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