Institutions and Monetary Policy

Citations

Cited by:

1. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal commitment in an open economy : Credibility vs. flexibility," Discussion Paper 1995-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Sylvester Eijffinger & Eric Schaling, 1995. "Optimal Commitment in an Open Economy: Credibility vs. Flexibility," Bank of England working papers 41, Bank of England.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal commitment in an open economy : Credibility vs. flexibility," Other publications TiSEM d6bf01ec-595f-43ad-a0b7-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1997. "Optimal commitment in an open economy : Credibility vs. flexibility," Other publications TiSEM f87d017a-7727-44bb-bf7a-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
2. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August.
   • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Other publications TiSEM 004d10de-12f0-4be1-9a7f-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Research Memorandum 024, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
   • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Discussion Paper 1995-59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," DELTA Working Papers 95-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
3. Schaling, E., 1998. "The Nonlinear Phillips Curve and Inflation Forecast Targeting - Symmetric Versus Asymmetric Monetary Policy Rules," Other publications TiSEM d6b03994-a406-4ac5-9c4d-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
   • Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Working Papers 121, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
   • Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Papers 630, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," NBER Working Papers 6329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Persson, Torsten & Tabellini , Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Seminar Papers 630, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
   • Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
5. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998. "The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 397-411, July.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1996. "The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Discussion Paper 1996-44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1998. "The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness," Other publications TiSEM edcd13f6-471a-415a-b14e-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1996. "The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Other publications TiSEM c8b984f9-6270-4052-b06b-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
6. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Schaling, Eric & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998. "Central bank independence: A sensitivity analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 73-88, February.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1997. "Central Bank independence : A sensitivity analysis," Other publications TiSEM 4bd0c7cd-5e22-41ff-8074-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1998. "Central bank independence : A sensitivity analysis," Other publications TiSEM ebcf989c-472b-4d24-b7c2-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1997. "Central bank independence : A sensitivity analysis," Other publications TiSEM 59020a3a-1cb8-4e8f-a2b8-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1997. "Central Bank independence : A sensitivity analysis," Discussion Paper 1997-10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
7. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco & Schaling, Eric, 2000. "Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(2), pages 218-235, May.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Schaling, E., 1997. "Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers : Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique," Discussion Paper 1997-47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Schaling, E., 1997. "Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers : Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique," Other publications TiSEM 493a7338-7811-42a3-88e2-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
8. Lippi, Francesco, 2000. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 323-338, December.
   • Lippi, F., 1999. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatis," Papers 351, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
   • Francesco Lippi, 1999. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 351, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
9. Berger Helge & Thum Marcel, 2000. "News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 1(4), pages 465-493, December.
   • Helge Berger & Marcel Thum, 2000. "News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(4), pages 465-493, November.
10. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2006. "Signaling And Commitment: Monetary Versus Inflation Targeting," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(5), pages 595-624, November.
    • Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2003. "Signalling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 4151, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
11. Joël Hellier, 1999. "Independence of the Central Bank, Growth, and Coalitions in a Monetary Union," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(2), pages 285-311, December.
12. Franz R. Hahn & Peter Mooslechner, 1999. "Zur Fundierung des Designs des Europäischen Zentralbanksystems," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 72(1), pages 49-60, January.
13. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
14. Schaling, Eric, 2004. "The Nonlinear Phillips Curve and Inflation Forecast Targeting: Symmetric versus Asymmetric Monetary Policy Rules," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 361-386, June.
    • Schaling, E., 1998. "The Nonlinear Phillips Curve and Inflation Forecast Targeting - Symmetric Versus Asymmetric Monetary Policy Rules," Discussion Paper 1998-136, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
15. King Banaian, 2008. "Measuring Central Bank Independence: Ordering, Ranking, or Scoring?," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: King Banaian & Bryan Roberts (ed.), The Design and Use of Political Economy Indicators, chapter 0, pages 33-55, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • King Banaian, 2007. "Measuring Central Bank Independence: Ordering, Ranking, or Scoring?," Working Papers 2008-3 Classification-E58, Saint Cloud State University, Department of Economics, revised 28 Feb 2008.
16. James Forder, 2000. "Traps in the Measurement of Independence and Accountability of Central Banks," Economics Series Working Papers 23, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
17. Hoeberichts, M.M., 1998. "The design of monetary institutions," Other publications TiSEM a4abdd37-d544-457b-b851-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
18. Rodney Wilson, 1997. "Book Review: Central Banking in an Interest Free Banking System, by: Hamid Zangeneh and Ahmad Salam, Comments: Rodney Wilson مراجعة علمية لكتاب: الأعمال المصرفية المركزية في نظام الخدمات المصرفية بدون," Book reviews and book reports published in the Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics. 413, King Abdulaziz University, Islamic Economics Institute..
19. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Monetary Cohabitation in Europe," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 111-116, May.
    • Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Monetary Cohabitation in Europe," Working Papers 96, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    • Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Monetary Cohabitation in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 1380, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1996. "Monetary Cohabitation in Europe," NBER Working Papers 5532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
20. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal conservativeness in the Rogoff (1985) model : A graphical and closed-form solution," Discussion Paper 1995-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal conservativeness in the Rogoff (1985) model : A graphical and closed-form solution," Other publications TiSEM c0088be4-00da-4fea-8ab5-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
21. Caitlin Ainsley, 2022. "Federal reserve appointments and the politics of senate confirmation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 93-110, January.
22. Alain Kabundi & Eric Schaling, 2013. "Inflation and Inflation Expectations in South Africa: an Attempt at Explanation," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 81(3), pages 346-355, September.
23. Richard C.K. Burdekin & King Banaian & Mark Hallerberg & Pierre L. Siklos, 2011. "Fiscal and monetary institutions and policies: onward and upward?," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 3(4), pages 340-354, November.
24. Michael T. Kiley, 1998. "Monetary policy under neoclassical and New-Keynesian Phillips Curves, with an application to price level and inflation targeting," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-27, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
25. Thierry Warin, 2005. "Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0508, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
26. Thierry Warin, 2006. "A Note on Post-Modern Monetary Policy," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0617, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.