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Optimal conservativeness in the Rogoff (1985) model : A graphical and closed-form solution

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  • Eijffinger, S.C.W.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Hoeberichts, M.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Schaling, E.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal conservativeness in the Rogoff (1985) model : A graphical and closed-form solution," Other publications TiSEM c0088be4-00da-4fea-8ab5-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:c0088be4-00da-4fea-8ab5-e30fc0dc7532
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-286, March.
    2. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
    3. Haizhou Huang & Michele Fratianni, 1995. "Central Bank Reputation and Conservativeness," FMG Discussion Papers dp216, Financial Markets Group.
    4. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1995. "The ultimate determinants of central bank independence," Other publications TiSEM 08ac747d-531c-4bee-8a47-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    6. Eric Schaling, 1995. "Institutions and Monetary Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 547, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:bla:jecsur:v:14:y:2000:i:5:p:527-61 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. P. Morgan & D. Peel, 2003. "The optimal output target and degree of banker conservativeness in a model with a non-linear Phillips curve," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(6), pages 323-330.
    3. Walsh, Carl E, 2003. "Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 829-849, October.
    4. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998. "The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 397-411, July.
    5. Sénégas, Marc-Alexandre & Vilmunen, Jouko, 1999. "The effects of transmission uncertainty on the flexibility-credibility tradeoff in monetary policy," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 14/1999, Bank of Finland.
    6. D. A. Peel, 2001. "Uncertain central bankers preferences: some implications of multiplicative versus additive uncertainty," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 17-20.

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