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On the provision of excludable public goods

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. George Economides & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2024. "On the provision of excludable public goods: General taxes or user prices?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 71(3), pages 379-415, July.
  2. Paul Madden, 2008. "Price, quality and welfare consequences of alternative club objectives in a professional sport league," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0802, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  3. Erwin Dekker & Pavel Kuchař, 2024. "Correction: Markets and knowledge commons: is there a difference between private and community governance of markets?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 201(3), pages 555-556, December.
  4. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 203-238, May.
  5. Clive Fraser & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2006. "Comparing the first-best and second-best provision of a club good: an example," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(4), pages 1-6.
  6. Bernd Huber & Marco Runkel, 2009. "Tax competition, excludable public goods, and user charges," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(3), pages 321-336, June.
  7. al-Nowaihi, Ali & Fraser, Clive D., 2007. "Is the public sector too large in an economy with club goods? A case when consumers differ in both tastes and incomes," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1018-1031, November.
  8. Kemnitz Alexander, 2013. "A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 14(4), pages 432-448, December.
  9. Sören Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen, 2005. "The Role of Prices for Excludable Public Goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(1), pages 61-79, January.
  10. Hines Jr., James R., 2000. "What is benefit taxation?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 483-492, March.
  11. Fuest, Clemens & Kolmar, Martin, 2007. "A theory of user-fee competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 497-509, April.
  12. Bai, Chong-En & Lu, Yi & Tao, Zhigang, 2009. "Excludable public goods: Pricing and social welfare maximization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 72-74, May.
  13. Heywood, John S. & Li, Dongyang & Ye, Guangliang, 2023. "Private provision of price excludable public goods by rivals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 291-307.
  14. Clive D. Fraser, 2022. "Faith? Hope? Charity? Religion explains giving when warm glow and impure altruism do not," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(5), pages 500-523, September.
  15. Kurtis J. Swope & Eckhard Janeba, 2005. "Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 405-426, August.
  16. Fraser, Clive D., 2005. "Corrigendum to "When is efficiency separable from distribution in the provision of club goods?" [Journal of Economic Theory 90 (2000) 204-221]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 194-197, December.
  17. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2006:i:4:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Que, Wei & Zhang, Yabin & Liu, Shaobo, 2018. "The spatial spillover effect of fiscal decentralization on local public provision: Mathematical application and empirical estimation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 331(C), pages 416-429.
  19. Economides, George & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Sakkas, Stelios, 2017. "Tuition fees: User prices and private incentives," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 91-103.
  20. Maxime Agbo & Agnes Zabsonre, 2023. "Why and how a well-intended (local) government can hide information from citizens for their own good: The case of public goods provision in less developed areas," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 43(1), pages 484-499.
  21. Ingrid Ott & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 2006. "Excludable and Non‐excludable Public Inputs: Consequences for Economic Growth," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 73(292), pages 725-748, November.
  22. George Economides & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2012. "Are User Fees Really Regressive?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3875, CESifo.
  23. Martin Kolmar, 2015. "Costly Exclusion, Property-Rights Enforcement, and the Optimal Supply of Rival and Nonrival Goods," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(3), pages 405-431, September.
  24. Chang Jen-Wen, 2020. "Should the Talk be Cheap in Contribution Games?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-16, June.
  25. Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "Exclusion and moral hazard: A further analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 295-301, May.
  26. Clemens Fuest & Martin Kolmar, 2013. "Endogenous free riding and the decentralized user-fee financing of spillover goods in a n-region economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(2), pages 169-191, April.
  27. Gravel, Nicolas & Poitevin, Michel, 2019. "Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 451-460.
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