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Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Neeman, Zvika, 2004. "The relevance of private information in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 55-77, July.
  2. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents," JEPS Working Papers 05-007, JEPS.
  3. Kalai, Ehud & Shmaya, Eran, 2018. "Large strategic dynamic interactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 59-81.
  4. Matthew Jackson & Ilan Kremer, 2007. "Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(3), pages 185-198, November.
  5. Hans Gersbach, 2002. "Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 749, CESifo.
  6. Ronen Gradwohl & Omer Reingold & Ariel Yadin & Amir Yehudayoff, 2009. "Players' Effects Under Limited Independence," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(4), pages 971-980, November.
  7. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2001. "Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 26-39, October.
  8. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2013. "Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2436-2466.
  9. Rong, Kang, 2014. "Proportional individual rationality and the provision of a public good in a large economy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 187-196.
  10. Smorodinsky, Rann & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2006. "Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations--The anonymous case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 385-406, May.
  11. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2023. "Bad apples in symmetric repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
  12. Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188.
  13. Birulin, Oleksii, 2006. "Public goods with congestion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 289-299, July.
  14. Deb, Joyee & Kalai, Ehud, 2015. "Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1041-1055.
  15. Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen Weibull, 2008. "Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium," Working Papers halshs-00121741, HAL.
  16. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2010. "Partial exposure in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 602-613, March.
  17. Steven Lalley & Glen Weyl, 2015. "Quadratic Voting," Working Papers 2016-13, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  18. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 153-171, February.
  19. Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2008. "Information acquisition in committees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 436-459, March.
  20. Yaron Azrieli & Eran Shmaya, 2013. "Lipschitz Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(2), pages 350-357, May.
  21. Johannes Gerd Becker, 2012. "A Note on the Number of (alpha) -Pivotal Players," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 37(1), pages 196-200, February.
  22. Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 2001. "A reputational model of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 165-191, October.
  23. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 0. "Repeated games with many players," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  24. Martin F. Hellwig, 2003. "Public-Good Provision with Many Participants," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 589-614.
  25. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2007. "The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 383-403, November.
  26. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2014. "Fault tolerance in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 438-457.
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