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Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wai Fong Chua & Habib Mahama, 2007. "The Effect of Network Ties on Accounting Controls in a Supply Alliance: Field Study Evidence," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(1), pages 47-86, March.
  2. Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
  3. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
  4. Kirstein, Roland, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to "Lean" Organizations," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2003-07, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  5. Mary Vayaliparampil & Frank Page & Eric Wolterstorff, 2021. "The Missing Ingredient for Successful Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships: Cooperative Capacity," Societies, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-30, April.
  6. Özgür Kıbrıs & Arzu Kıbrıs, 2016. "On surplus-sharing in partnerships," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(1), pages 89-111, June.
  7. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
  8. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
  9. Xinyu Li & Wendelin Schnedler, 2025. "Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(10), pages 8252-8266, October.
  10. Poblete, Joaquín, 2015. "Profit sharing and market structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 10-18.
  11. Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort & Nicolas Roux, 2024. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1589-1646, December.
  12. Marx, Leslie M. & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Individual accountability in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 260-273, October.
  13. Jungho Lee, 2020. "Estimating the benefits and costs of forming business partnerships," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 531-562, June.
  14. Jianpei Li, 2009. "Team production with inequity-averse agents," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 8(2), pages 119-136, August.
  15. Matsuzawa, Satoshi, 2024. "Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
  16. Huddart, Steven & Liang, Pierre Jinghong, 2005. "Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 153-187, December.
  17. Ferreyra, Maria Marta & Liang, Pierre Jinghong, 2012. "Information asymmetry and equilibrium monitoring in education," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 237-254.
  18. Alex Gershkov & Eyal Winter, 2015. "Formal versus Informal Monitoring in Teams," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 27-44, May.
  19. Gershkov, Alex & Li, Jianpei & Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Collective Production and Incentives," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 186, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  20. Goldfayn, Ekaterina, 2006. "Organization of R&D With Two Agents and Principal," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 3/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  21. Maris Goldmanis & Korok Ray, 2021. "Team incentives under private contracting," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 334-358, June.
  22. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2009. "Efficient tournaments within teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 103-119, March.
  23. Bisin, Alberto & Guaitoli, Danilo, 2012. "Information extraction and norms of mutual protection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 154-162.
  24. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
  25. Björn Bartling & Ferdinand A. von Siemens, 2010. "Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 299-320, June.
  26. Guney, Begum & Kibris, Arzu & Kıbrıs, Özgür, 2025. "Incentivizing group investments: Surplus sharing agreements in theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
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