IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model"

by Wang, Cheng

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "Optimal CEO compensation and stock options," Working Papers. Serie EC 2008-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 239-256, February.
  3. Manuel Santos & Jorge Aseff, . "Stock Options and Managerial Optimal Contracts," Working Papers 2133304, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
  4. Cooley, Thomas F & Marimon, Ramon & Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2013. "Risky Investments with Limited Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 9725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Cheng Wang, . "Stock Grants as Commitment Device," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E12, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  6. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2006. "Moral Hazard and Persistence," 2006 Meeting Papers 670, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 265-300.
  8. Itza Curiel & Sonia Di Giannatale & Juan Herrera & Katya Rodríguez, 2012. "Pareto Frontier of a Dynamic Principal–Agent Model with Discrete Actions: An Evolutionary Multi-Objective Approach," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 40(4), pages 415-443, December.
  9. Jarque, Arantxa & John, Muth, 2013. "Evaluating Executive Compensation Packages," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 251-285.
  10. Jarque, Arantxa, 2014. "The Complexity of CEO Compensation," Working Paper 14-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  11. Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation," FMG Discussion Papers dp660, Financial Markets Group.
  12. Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 713-751, May.
  13. Emilio Espino & Juan M. Sanchez, 2010. "Risk sharing, investment, and incentives in the neoclassical growth model," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 399-416.
  14. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley, 2009. "Executive Compensation: Facts," NBER Working Papers 15426, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Wang, Cheng, 2005. "Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model," Staff General Research Papers 12403, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  16. Philip Bond & Andrew F. Newman, 2006. "Prohibitions on Punishments in Private Contracts," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-060, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  17. Giat, Yahel & Subramanian, Ajay, 2013. "Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2833-2861.
  18. Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Hidden effort, learning by doing, and wage dynamics," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 339-372.
  19. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Chen Wang, 2004. "Stock Grants as a Committment Device," Working Papers 04-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  20. Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti, 2006. "Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Female Top Executives," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-061, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  21. Sonia Di Giannatale Menegalli & Itza T. Q. Curiel-Cabral, 2013. "Compromises and Incentives," Working papers DTE 559, CIDE, División de Economía.
  22. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 1207, CIRPEE.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.