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Citations for "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model"

by Wang, Cheng

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  1. Clementi, Gian Luca & Cooley, Thomas F. & Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Stock grants as a commitment device," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2191-2216, November.
  2. Giat, Yahel & Subramanian, Ajay, 2013. "Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2833-2861.
  3. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2006. "Moral Hazard and Persistence," 2006 Meeting Papers 670, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Emilio Espino & Juan M. Sanchez, 2010. "Risk sharing, investment, and incentives in the neoclassical growth model," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 399-416.
  5. Wang, Cheng, 2011. "Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-110, January.
  6. Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Hidden effort, learning by doing, and wage dynamics," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 339-372.
  7. Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 239-256, February.
  8. Sonia Di Giannatale Menegalli & Itza T. Q. Curiel-Cabral, 2013. "Compromises and Incentives," Working papers DTE 559, CIDE, División de Economía.
  9. repec:eme:rleczz:s0147-912120150000042001 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti & María José Prados, 2015. "Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Top Executives," Research in Labor Economics,in: Gender in the Labor Market, volume 42, pages 1-59 Emerald Publishing Ltd.
  11. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley, 2009. "Executive Compensation: Facts," Working Papers 09-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  12. Itza Curiel & Sonia Di Giannatale & Juan Herrera & Katya Rodríguez, 2012. "Pareto Frontier of a Dynamic Principal–Agent Model with Discrete Actions: An Evolutionary Multi-Objective Approach," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 40(4), pages 415-443, December.
  13. Vincenzo Quadrini & Ramon Marimon & Thomas Cooley, 2012. "Risky Investments with Limited Commitment," 2012 Meeting Papers 603, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  14. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatale, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 861-885, October.
  15. Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation," FMG Discussion Papers dp660, Financial Markets Group.
  16. Amal Hili & Didier Laussel & Ngo Van Long, 2016. "Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective: the role of stock grants," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-48, CIRANO.
  17. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 265-300.
  18. Jarque, Arantxa, 2014. "The Complexity of CEO Compensation," Working Paper 14-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  19. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 1207, CIRPEE.
  20. Clementi, Gian Luca & Cooley, Thomas F. & Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Stock grants as a commitment device," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2191-2216, November.
  21. Jorge Aseff & Manuel Santos, 2005. "Stock options and managerial optimal contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 813-837, November.
  22. Bond, Philip & Newman, Andrew F., 2009. "Prohibitions on punishments in private contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 526-540, October.
  23. Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti, 2006. "Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Female Top Executives," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-061, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  24. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "Optimal CEO compensation and stock options," Working Papers. Serie EC 2008-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  25. Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 713-751, May.
  26. Jarque, Arantxa & John, Muth, 2013. "Evaluating Executive Compensation Packages," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 251-285.
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