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Citations for "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model"

by Wang, Cheng

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  1. Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Hidden effort, learning by doing, and wage dynamics," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 339-372.
  2. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatale, 2009. "A Theory of Firm Decline," NBER Working Papers 15192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 713-751, May.
  4. Andrew Newman & Philip Bond, 2004. "Prohibitions on Punishments in Private Contracts," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 143, Econometric Society.
  5. Giat, Yahel & Subramanian, Ajay, 2013. "Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2833-2861.
  6. Emilio Espino & Juan M. Sanchez, 2010. "Risk sharing, investment, and incentives in the neoclassical growth model," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 399-416.
  7. Wang, Cheng, 2005. "Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12403, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  8. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 265-300.
  9. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "Optimal CEO compensation and stock options," Working Papers. Serie EC 2008-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  10. Thomas F. Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2013. "Risky Investments with Limited Commitment," NBER Working Papers 19594, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley, 2009. "Executive Compensation: Facts," Working Papers 09-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  12. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2006. "Moral Hazard and Persistence," 2006 Meeting Papers 670, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  13. Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  14. Amal Hili & Didier Laussel & Ngo Van Long, 2016. "Disentangling Managerial Incentives from a Dynamic Perspective: The Role of Stock Grants," CESifo Working Paper Series 6083, CESifo Group Munich.
  15. Sonia Di Giannatale Menegalli & Itza T. Q. Curiel-Cabral, 2013. "Compromises and Incentives," Working papers DTE 559, CIDE, División de Economía.
  16. Albanesi, Stefania & Olivetti, Claudia & Prados, María José, 2015. "Gender and dynamic agency: theory and evidence on the compensation of top executives," Staff Reports 718, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  17. Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation," FMG Discussion Papers dp660, Financial Markets Group.
  18. Jarque, Arantxa & John, Muth, 2013. "Evaluating Executive Compensation Packages," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 251-285.
  19. Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti, 2006. "Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Female Top Executives," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-061, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  20. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 1207, CIRPEE.
  21. Jorge Aseff & Manuel Santos, 2005. "Stock options and managerial optimal contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 813-837, November.
  22. Itza Curiel & Sonia Di Giannatale & Juan Herrera & Katya Rodríguez, 2012. "Pareto Frontier of a Dynamic Principal–Agent Model with Discrete Actions: An Evolutionary Multi-Objective Approach," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 40(4), pages 415-443, December.
  23. Clementi, Gian Luca & Cooley, Thomas F. & Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Stock Grants As a Commitment Device," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12300, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  24. Jarque, Arantxa, 2014. "The Complexity of CEO Compensation," Working Paper 14-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
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