IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/jetheo/v105y2002i2p408-434.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2018. "On random social choice functions with the tops-only property," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 413-435.
  2. Stefano Vannucci, 2017. "Tree-Wise Single Peaked Domains," Department of Economics University of Siena 770, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  3. Chatterji, Shurojit & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia, 2016. "A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
  4. Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas, 2020. "On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1059-1080, December.
  5. ,, 2009. "Strategy-proofness and single-crossing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
  6. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2008. "Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-13, January.
  7. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
  8. Pycia, Marek & Ünver, M. Utku, 2015. "Decomposing random mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 21-33.
  9. Bhardwaj, Bhavook & Kumar, Rajnish & Ortega, Josué, 2020. "Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  10. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2021. "A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
  11. Souvik Roy & Soumyarup Sadhukhan, 2019. "A characterization of random min–max domains and its applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(4), pages 887-906, November.
  12. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Optimal Voting Rules," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 688-717.
  13. Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2006. "Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 27-43, January.
  14. Chatterji, Shurojit & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia, 2014. "Random dictatorship domains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 212-236.
  15. Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava & Storcken, Ton, 2014. "Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 123-127.
  16. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2022. "On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
  17. William Thomson, 2018. "On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 67-99, June.
  18. Lê Nguyên Hoang, 2017. "Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 679-701, March.
  19. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  20. Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 84-90.
  21. Gogulapati Sreedurga & Soumyarup Sadhukhan & Souvik Roy & Yadati Narahari, 2022. "Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences," Papers 2207.07984, arXiv.org.
  22. Gordon, Sidartha, 2007. "Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 225-241, November.
  23. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2009. "Fully sincere voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 720-735, November.
  24. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 25-105.
  25. Shuhei Morimoto, 2013. "Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 637-669, September.
  26. Haris Aziz & Alexander Lam & Mashbat Suzuki & Toby Walsh, 2022. "Random Rank: The One and Only Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Randomized Facility Location Mechanism," Papers 2205.14798, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
  27. Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi, 2020. "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 219-238.
  28. Michael Müller & Clemens Puppe, 2023. "Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 131-151, April.
  29. Protopapas, Panos, 2018. "On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals," MPRA Paper 83939, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Shurojit Chatterji & Souvik Roy & Soumyarup Sadhukhan & Arunava Sen & Huaxia Zeng, 2021. "Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domains," Papers 2105.10677, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  31. Chatterji, Shurojit & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia, 2022. "Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
  32. Felix Brandt & Patrick Lederer & Ren'e Romen, 2022. "Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes," Papers 2201.10418, arXiv.org.
  33. Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2018. "Random social choice functions for single-peaked domains on trees," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  34. Morimoto, Shuhei, 2022. "Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
  35. Felix Brand & Patrick Lederer & Sascha Tausch, 2023. "Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains," Papers 2302.12140, arXiv.org.
  36. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Optimal Mechanism Design without Money," Working Papers tecipa-481, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  37. Arunava Sen, 2011. "The Gibbard random dictatorship theorem: a generalization and a new proof," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 515-527, December.
  38. John A. Weymark, 2008. "Strategy‐Proofness and the Tops‐Only Property," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(1), pages 7-26, February.
  39. Hans Peters & Souvik Roy & Soumyarup Sadhukhan, 2021. "Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 811-833, May.
  40. Núñez, Matías, 2015. "Threshold voting leads to Type-Revelation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 211-213.
  41. Alejandro Saporiti, 2006. "Strategic voting on single-crossing domains," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0617, Economics, The University of Manchester.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.