IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "On controlling crime with corrupt officials"

by Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Mishra, Ajit, 2002. "Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 165-178, February.
  2. Cooter, Robert & Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt83c0k3wc, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  3. Dominic Spengler, 2012. "Endogenising Detection in an Asymmetric Penalties Corruption Game," Discussion Papers 12/20, Department of Economics, University of York.
  4. Garoupa, Nuno & Jellal, Mohamed, 2002. "Information, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," CEPR Discussion Papers 3560, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Garoupa, Nuno & Klerman, Daniel, 2004. "Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 219-225, June.
  6. Nuno Garoupa & Mohamed Jellal, 2007. "Further notes on information, corruption, and optimal law enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 59-69, February.
  7. Kugler, Maurice & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2003. "Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment," Working Paper Series 600, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  8. Marcel Thum, 2005. "Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft," Ifo Working Paper Series Ifo Working Papers No.12, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
  9. Acconcia, Antonio & Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore & Rey, Patrick, 2013. "Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 9543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Herbert Dawid & Gustav Feichtinger, 1996. "On the persistence of corruption," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 177-193, June.
  11. Bose, Gautam, 2004. "Bureaucratic delays and bribe-taking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 313-320, July.
  12. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2005. "Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0205, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  13. Marjit, Sugata & Rajeev, Meenakshi & Mukherjee, Diganta, 2000. "Incomplete information as a deterrent to crime," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 763-773, November.
  14. Loukas Balafoutas, 2009. "Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game," Working Papers 2009-01, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  15. Kolmar, Martin & Marjit, Sugata, 2002. "The informal sector as a substitute for social security," Discussion Papers, Series I 316, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
  16. Sugata Marjit & Arijit Mukherjee, 1996. "A Simple Theory of Harassment and Corruption," Discussion Paper Serie A 527, University of Bonn, Germany.
  17. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Mandal, Biswajit, 2012. "Bureaucratic reform, informal sector and welfare," MPRA Paper 36072, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Thum, Marcel, 2004. "Korruption," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 11/04, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  19. Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  20. Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings?," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 0902, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2009.
  21. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation," Working Papers 0506, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  22. Mandal, Biswajit & Marjit, Sugata, 2010. "Corruption and wage inequality?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 166-172, January.
  23. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2000. "Harassment, corruption and tax policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 75-94, March.
  24. VafaI, Kouroche, 2005. "Abuse of authority and collusion in organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 385-405, June.
  25. Van-Ha Le & Jakob de Haan & Erik Dietzenbacher, 2013. "Do Higher Government Wages Reduce Corruption? Evidence Based on a Novel Dataset," CESifo Working Paper Series 4254, CESifo Group Munich.
  26. Amit Biswas & Sugata Marjit, 2005. "Mis-invoicing and Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 189-205.
  27. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2009. "Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 360-374, December.
  28. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation," Post-Print halshs-00180044, HAL.
  29. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September.
  30. Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong & Yang, C. C., 2000. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 35-51, March.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.