IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!)

Citations for "On controlling crime with corrupt officials"

by Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Marjit, Sugata & Rajeev, Meenakshi & Mukherjee, Diganta, 2000. "Incomplete information as a deterrent to crime," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 763-773, November.
  2. Mishra, Ajit, 2002. "Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 165-178, February.
  3. Dominic Spengler, 2012. "Endogenising Detection in an Asymmetric Penalties Corruption Game," Discussion Papers 12/20, Department of Economics, University of York.
  4. Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ?," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-11, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  5. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Mandal, Biswajit, 2012. "Bureaucratic reform, informal sector and welfare," MPRA Paper 36072, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Acconcia, Antonio & Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore & Rey, Patrick, 2013. "Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 9543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation," Post-Print halshs-00180044, HAL.
  8. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2000. "Harassment, corruption and tax policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 75-94, March.
  9. Nuno Garoupa & Mohamed Jellal, 2007. "Further notes on information, corruption, and optimal law enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 59-69, February.
  10. Herbert Dawid & Gustav Feichtinger, 1996. "On the persistence of corruption," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 177-193, June.
  11. Marcel Thum, 2005. "Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft," Ifo Working Paper Series Ifo Working Papers No.12, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
  12. Garoupa, Nuno & Jellal, Mohamed, 2002. "Information, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," CEPR Discussion Papers 3560, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Astrid Gamba & Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo, 2016. "Corruption, Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law," CSEF Working Papers 446, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  14. Loukas Balafoutas, 2011. "Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game," Post-Print hal-00978259, HAL.
  15. Amit Biswas & Sugata Marjit, 2005. "Mis-invoicing and Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 189-205.
  16. Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong & Yang, C. C., 2000. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 35-51, March.
  17. VafaI, Kouroche, 2005. "Abuse of authority and collusion in organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 385-405, June.
  18. Kugler, Maurice & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2003. "Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment," CEPR Discussion Papers 3806, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2009. "Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 360-374, December.
  20. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September.
  21. Mandal, Biswajit & Marjit, Sugata, 2010. "Corruption and wage inequality?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 166-172, January.
  22. Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2006. "Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 478-499, December.
  23. Van-Ha Le & Jakob de Haan & Erik Dietzenbacher, 2013. "Do Higher Government Wages Reduce Corruption? Evidence Based on a Novel Dataset," CESifo Working Paper Series 4254, CESifo Group Munich.
  24. Kolmar, Martin & Marjit, Sugata, 2002. "The informal sector as a substitute for social security," Discussion Papers, Series I 316, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
  25. Spengler Dominic, 2014. "Endogenous Detection of Collaborative Crime: The Case of Corruption," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 17, July.
  26. Garoupa, Nuno & Klerman, Daniel, 2004. "Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 219-225, June.
  27. Bose, Gautam, 2004. "Bureaucratic delays and bribe-taking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 313-320, July.
  28. Sugata Marjit & Arijit Mukherjee, 1996. "A Simple Theory of Harassment and Corruption," Discussion Paper Serie A 527, University of Bonn, Germany.
  29. John Bone & Dominic Spengler, 2014. "Does Reporting Decrease Corruption?," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 26(1-2), pages 161-186, January.
  30. Thum, Marcel, 2004. "Korruption," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 11/04, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  31. Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  32. Cooter, Robert & Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt83c0k3wc, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.